Background
Hartmann, Nicolai was born on February 20, 1882 in Riga, Lativa.
metaphysician ethics ethicist infs: Ontology
Hartmann, Nicolai was born on February 20, 1882 in Riga, Lativa.
St Petersburg (gymnasium. Philology), Dorpat, Estonia (Medicine) and University of Marburg (Philosophy PhD).
1920-1925, Professor of Philosophy, University of Marburg. 1925-1931, Professor of Philosophy, University of Cologne. 1931-1945, Professor of Philosophy, University of Berlin.
1945-1950, Professor of Philosophy, University of Göttingen.
Nicolai Hartmann, a major German philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century, was primarily a metaphysician, but is best known in the English-speaking world for his monumental Ethics. The most characteristic features of his work are his ‘aporetic method’, and his insistence on the priority of ontology over epistemology. He saw his aporetic method as continuous with the best in Plato and Aristotle, as consistent with the scientific spirit and as central to productive philosophizing. The aporetic method consists of two phases: first, a careful phenomenology of relevant facts; second, a dialectical clarification of the problems they present. Wherever possible, Hartmann formulated problems as antinomies, assessing each side carefully. Hartmann thus eschewed the German tradition of system-building in favour of his unique aporetic approach. Hartmann fully ontologized the relation between knower and known. Setting the two ‘modes of Being on an equal footing in so far as they are both objective and independent of the knower, he proceeded to articulate them by a method partly phenomenological, partly logical and partly metaphysical. This resulted in ‘ontological stratifications’, Hartmann’s unique metaphysical approach. New Ways of Ontology and Ethics contain its most important examples. Hartmann's most enduring contribution to philosophy will undoubtedly be his Ethics, the aretaic aspect of which has probably already exerted invisible influences. The Ethics comprises both a general theory of value and a revival of the long-neglected aretaic method of doing ethics, originated by Aristotle. Aretaic ethics is virtue-centred ethics, an alternative to utilitarianism and formalism. Hartmann's phenomenology of virtues is in volume II, written in lucid, sometimes austerely poetic prose, illuminating and inspiring. It is governed, Hartmann says, by a ‘logic of the heart’, and the influence of Nietzsche is as powerful as that of Aristotle. Volume I is an aporetic phenomenology of morality and a history of normative ethics and ethical theory. Fortunately, volume Ill's unconvincing attempt to solve the problem of freedom does not impair the majesty of the second volume. Certain aspects of Hartmann’s philosophy have been compared with Anglo-American work. His value Platonism has been compared with A. N Whitehead’s and contrasted with G. E. Moore's. Several factors in Hartmann’s epistemology are reminiscent of C. S. Peirce. ‘Father of American Pragmatism', namely Peirce’s subtle balancing of anti-dogmatic objectivism with non-nihilistic fallibilism. On the other hand. Hartmann's value mtuitionism, seemingly incorrigible although radically pluralistic, stands in a paradoxical relation to fallibilism. Hartmann claims to resolve this antinomy with a searchlight metaphor according to which values themselves do not change but rather our perceptions of them. Although this Kantianized value Platonism runs against the current of the times, Hartmann shares the existentialist conviction that human beings must heroically endow reality with meanlr*gFor, despite the partial intelligibility and orderliness of reality and ideality, neither God nor cosmic purpose exists. Despite his objectivism, Hartmann's interests are not religious. Nevertheless, his ‘emotional apriorism' imparts a spiritual tone to the Ethics which will always appeal to some. In a century starved of sober inspirational thoughts on the virtues. Ethics H towers alone.