Background
SCHELLING, Thomas was born on April 14, 1921 in Oakland, California, United States. Son of John M. Schelling and Zelda M. Ayres Schelling.
(International Economics, 16e continues to combine rigorou...)
International Economics, 16e continues to combine rigorous economic analysis with attention to the issues of economic policy that are alive and important today in this field. Written in a concise and readable format, Pugel uses economic terminology when enhancing the analysis so that the reader can build their understanding of global economic developments and evaluate proposals for changes in economic policies. The text is informed by current events and includes the latest in applied international research, all the time avoiding jargon for jargon’s sake. Like earlier editions, Pugel also places international economics events within a historical framework. The overall treatment continues to be intuitive rather than mathematical and is strongly oriented towards policy. International Economics is thoroughly integrated with the adaptive digital tools available in McGraw-Hill’s LearnSmart Advantage Suite, proven to increase student engagement and success in the course. Connect is the only integrated learning system that empowers students by continuously adapting to deliver precisely what they need, when they need it, and how they need it, so that your class time is more engaging and effective.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0078021774/?tag=2022091-20
(International Economics, 15e continues to combine rigorou...)
International Economics, 15e continues to combine rigorous economic analysis with attention to the issues of economic policy that are alive and important today in this field. Written in a concise and readable format, Pugel uses economic terminology when enhancing the analysis so that the reader can build their understanding of global economic developments and evaluate proposals for changes in economic policies. The text is informed by current events and includes the latest in applied international research, all the time avoiding jargon for jargon’s sake. Like earlier editions, Pugel also places international economics events within a historical framework. The overall treatment continues to be intuitive rather than mathematical and is strongly oriented towards policy.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0073523178/?tag=2022091-20
(A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, t...)
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0674840313/?tag=2022091-20
( Traditionally, Americans have viewed war as an alternat...)
Traditionally, Americans have viewed war as an alternative to diplomacy, and military strategy as the science of victory. Today, however, in our world of nuclear weapons, military power is not so much exercised as threatened. It is, Mr. Schelling says, bargaining power, and the exploitation of this power, for good or evil, to preserve peace or to threaten war, is diplomacy—the diplomacy of violence. The author concentrates in this book on the way in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. He sees the steps taken by the U.S. during the Berlin and Cuban crises as not merely preparations for engagement, but as signals to an enemy, with reports from the adversary's own military intelligence as our most important diplomatic communications. Even the bombing of North Vietnam, Mr. Schelling points out, is as much coercive as tactical, aimed at decisions as much as bridges. He carries forward the analysis so brilliantly begun in his earlier The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Strategy and Arms Control (with Morton Halperin, 1961), and makes a significant contribution to the growing literature on modern war and diplomacy. Stimson Lectures. Mr. Schelling is professor of economics at Harvard and acting director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. "An exemplary text on the interplay of national purpose and military force."—Book Week. "A grim but carefully reasoned and coldly analytical book. . . . One of the most frightening previews which this reviewer has ever seen of the roads that lie just ahead in warfare."—Los Angeles Times. "A brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in the stereotypes and moral attitudinizing."—New York Times Book Review.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0300143370/?tag=2022091-20
( Before Freakonomics and The Tipping Point there was thi...)
Before Freakonomics and The Tipping Point there was this classic by the 2005 Nobel Laureate in Economics. "Schelling here offers an early analysis of 'tipping' in social situations involving a large number of individuals."―official citation for the 2005 Nobel Prize Micromotives and Macrobehavior was originally published over twenty-five years ago, yet the stories it tells feel just as fresh today. And the subject of these stories―how small and seemingly meaningless decisions and actions by individuals often lead to significant unintended consequences for a large group―is more important than ever. In one famous example, Thomas C. Schelling shows that a slight-but-not-malicious preference to have neighbors of the same race eventually leads to completely segregated populations. The updated edition of this landmark book contains a new preface and the author's Nobel Prize acceptance speech.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0393329461/?tag=2022091-20
( Thomas Schelling is a political economist “conspicuous ...)
Thomas Schelling is a political economist “conspicuous for wandering”—an errant economist. In Choice and Consequence, he ventures into the area where rationality is ambiguous in order to look at the tricks people use to try to quit smoking or lose weight. He explores topics as awesome as nuclear terrorism, as sordid as blackmail, as ineffable as daydreaming, as intimidating as euthanasia. He examines ethical issues wrapped up in economics, unwrapping the economics to disclose ethical issues that are misplaced or misidentified. With an ingenious, often startling approach, Schelling brings new perspectives to problems ranging from drug abuse, abortion, and the value people put on their lives to organized crime, airplane hijacking, and automobile safety. One chapter is a clear and elegant exposition of game theory as a framework for analyzing social problems. Another plays with the hypothesis that our minds are not only our problem-solving equipment but also the organ in which much of our consumption takes place. What binds together the different subjects is the author’s belief in the possibility of simultaneously being humane and analytical, of dealing with both the momentous and the familiar. Choice and Consequence was written for the curious, the puzzled, the worried, and all those who appreciate intellectual adventure.
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( This work has been selected by scholars as being cultur...)
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
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( This book provides a new analysis of why relations betw...)
This book provides a new analysis of why relations between the United States and the Chinese Communists were so hostile in the first decade of the Cold War. Employing extensive documentation, it offers a fresh approach to long-debated questions such as why Truman refused to recognize the Chinese Communists, why the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek's KMT on Taiwan, why the Korean War escalated into a Sino-American conflict, and why Mao shelled islands in the Taiwan Straits in 1958, thus sparking a major crisis with the United States. Christensen first develops a novel two-level approach that explains why leaders manipulate low-level conflicts to mobilize popular support for expensive, long-term security strategies. By linking "grand strategy," domestic politics, and the manipulation of ideology and conflict, Christensen provides a nuanced and sophisticated link between domestic politics and foreign policy. He then applies the approach to Truman's policy toward the Chinese Communists in 1947-50 and to Mao's initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis. In these cases the extension of short-term conflict was useful in gaining popular support for the overall grand strategy that each leader was promoting domestically: Truman's limited-containment strategy toward the USSR and Mao's self-strengthening programs during the Great Leap Forward. Christensen also explores how such low-level conflicts can escalate, as they did in Korea, despite leaders' desire to avoid actual warfare.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691026378/?tag=2022091-20
SCHELLING, Thomas was born on April 14, 1921 in Oakland, California, United States. Son of John M. Schelling and Zelda M. Ayres Schelling.
Bachelor of Arts in Economics, University California, Berkeley, 1944. Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, Harvard University, 1951. Doctor (honorary), Yale University, 2009.
Economist United States Bureau of Budget, Washington, 1945—1946, The Marshall Plan, Paris, Copenhagen, 1948—1950, Executive Office of President, The White House, Washington, 1951—1953. Associate professor, then professor economics Yale University, New Haven, 1953-1958. Professor economics Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1958-1990, Lucius N. Littauer professor political economy, 1969—1990.
Professor economics public affairs University Maryland, College Park, 1990—2003, distinguished professor economics emeritus, since 2003. Senior staff member Research and Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1958—1959. Chairman research advisory board Committee Economic Development, Washington, 1978—1981, 1984—1985.
Member military economic advisory panel Central Intelligence Agency, 1980—1985. Director Institute Study of Smoking Behavior & Policy, Harvard University, 1984—1990. Co-faculty member New England Complex Systems Institute.
(A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, t...)
(International Economics, 16e continues to combine rigorou...)
(International Economics, 15e continues to combine rigorou...)
(International Economics, 14e continues to combine rigorou...)
( This book provides a new analysis of why relations betw...)
( This work has been selected by scholars as being cultur...)
( Traditionally, Americans have viewed war as an alternat...)
( Before Freakonomics and The Tipping Point there was thi...)
( Thomas Schelling is a political economist “conspicuous ...)
Author: National Income Behavior, 1951, International Economics, 1958, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960, Arms and Influence, 1966, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, 1978, Thinking Through the Energy Problem, 1979, Choice and Consequence, 1984, Strategies of Commitment, 2006. Co-author (with Morton H. Halperin): Strategy and Arms Control, 1961.
Bargaining caught my interest in graduate school, and I spent 1948-1953 in foreign aid negotiations in Europe and Washington, then went to Yale as an international economist interested in bargaining. Within a few years I switched to military strategy and arms control as the most inviting field of application, spent some time with the Rand Corporation, became a member of various advisory boards on military technology and arms control, moved to Harvard in 1959 divided between the economics department and the Center for International Affairs, and concentrated on national security strategy and defence economics through the 1960s.
The same interest in bargaining led into the study of crime, protest and terrorism. Government connections were severed in 1970 but I pursued the subject of nuclear proliferation, which took me into energy policy for several years.
Meanwhile an interest in race and other social divisions led to some modelling of segregation and integration and ultimately Micromotives and Macrobehavior. That same interest in bargaining drew me into fields
as apparently distant as the social arrangements for dying and global prospects for climate change from the concentration of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere. Finally, having always been intrigued by the problems people have in managing their own behaviour, I began working on addictive behaviours in the 1970s and by the early 1980s had settled on ‘self-command’ as my theoretical preoccupation, and smoking as a subject of applied research.
Fellow American Association for the Advancement of Science, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, American Economic Association (president 1991, Distinguished Fellow award). Member National Academy of Sciences (Award Behavioral Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1993), Institute Medicine, Eastern Economic Association (president 1996).
Running, hiking.
Married Corinne T. Saposs, September 13, 1947 (divorced 1991). Children: Andrew, Thomas, Daniel, Robert. Married Alice M. Coleman, November 8, 1991.