Background
Place, Ullin Thomas was born on October 24, 1924 in Northallerton, England. Son of Thomas and Dorothy Foster (Abraham) Place.
Place, Ullin Thomas was born on October 24, 1924 in Northallerton, England. Son of Thomas and Dorothy Foster (Abraham) Place.
Bachelor, Oxford University, 1949. Master of Arts, Oxford University, 1950. Diploma in anthropology, Oxford University, 1950.
Doctor of Letters, University Adelaide, 1972.
Along with J. J. C. Smart, he developed the identity theory of mind. There, he became acquainted with philosophy of mind in the logical behaviorist tradition, of which Ryle was a major exponent. Although he would later abandon logical behaviorism as a theory of the mind in favor of the type-identity theory, Place nevertheless continued to harbor sympathies toward the behavioristic approach to psychology in general.
In Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, Place formulated the thesis that mental states were not to be defined in terms of behavior.
Rather, one must identify them with neural states. With this bold thesis, Place became one of the fathers of the current materialistic mainstream of the philosophy of mind.
There are actually subtle but interesting differences between the three most widely credited formulations of the type identity thesis, those of Place, Feigl and Smart which were published in several articles in the late 1950s. Place"s notion of the identity involved in the identity thesis is derived from Bertrand Russell"s distinction among several types of is statements: the is of identity, the is of equality and the is of predication.
Place"s version of the relation of identity in the so-called identity thesis is more accurately described as an asymmetric relation of composition.
Foreign Place, higher-level mental events are composed out of lower-level physical events and will eventually be analytically reduced to these. To the objection that "sensations" do not mean the same thing as "mental processes", Place could simply reply with the example that "lightning" does not mean the same thing as "electrical discharge" since we determine that something is lightning by looking and seeing it, whereas we determine that something is an electrical discharge through experimentation and testing. Nevertheless, "lightning is an electrical discharge" is true since the one is composed of the other.
Similarly, "clouds are water vapor" means that "clouds are composed of droplets of water vapor" but not vice versa.
Foreign Feigl and Smart, on the other hand, the identity was to be interpreted as the identity between the referents of two descriptions (senses) which referred to the same thing, as in "the morning star" and "the evening star" both referring to Venus. So to the objection about the lack of equality of meaning between "sensation" and "brain process", their response was to invoke this Fregean distinction: "sensations" and "brain" processes do indeed mean different things but they refer to the same physical phenomenon.
Moreover, "sensations are brain processes" is a contingent, not a necessary, identity.
He even went so far as to defend the radical behaviorist theses of B.F. Skinner, as expressed in Verbal Behavior, from the criticisms of Noam Chomsky and the growing movement of cognitive psychology. Place, as well as J.J.C. Smart, nevertheless established his place in the annals of analytic philosophy by founding the theory which would eventually help to dethrone and displace philosophical behaviorism - the identity theory.
Fellow British Psychological Society. Member Association for Behavior Analysis, Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness.
Son of Thomas and Dorothy Foster (Abraham) P. M. Anna Nanette Wessel, July 1949 (divorced 1962). Children: Thomas Wessel, Frances Dorothy.
M. Norah Peggy Townsend, October 24, 1964.