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Albert Leroy DANIELSEN


Albert Leroy DANIELSEN, economist in the field of Energy; Public Utilities; Market Structure.


DANIELSEN, Albert Leroy was born in 1934 in Council Bluffs, Iowa, United States of America.


Bachelor of Science (Industrial Management) Clemson University, 1960. Doctor of Philosophy Duke University, 1966.


Instructor, Pfeiffer College, 1962, 1963. Assistant Professor, Association Professor, University Georgia, 1963-1968, 1968-1980. Acting Director, Office International Market Analysis, United States Department Energy, Washington District of Columbia, 1977-1978.

Special Assistant, Deputy Assistant, Secretary International Energy Research, United States Department Energy, 1978. Professor of Economics, University Georgia, Athens, Georgia, United States of America, since 1980.


  • National Defense Education Act Fellow, 1960-1961, 1961-1962, 1962-1963. Intergovernmental Personnel Act Program Participant, United States Dept, of Energy, 1976-1978. United States Social Science Research Council, United Kingdom or United States of America and Fullbright Research Award, since 1982.

    Director, Annual Georgia Public Utilities Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, since 1981. Executive Committee, International Association Energy Economists, 1981-1984.


Work orientated toward problems of the day. Early publications in economics of education and human capital. Borrowing a phrase from Abraham Lincoln, ‘the world will little note nor long remember’ those efforts.

The gasoline ‘shortages’ in 1973 and the October oil embargo kindled my interest in oil markets. Convinced that the traditional theory of cartel behaviour was inadequate for analysing the world oil market, I concluded that the theory is one-sided: it is incapable of explaining how an existing cartel arises in the first place. Coined the term ‘Cartel Rivalry’ to describe a more dynamic theory of cartel formation, breakdown and reformation.

Jury still out on this competing models designed to explain the level and stability of oil prices. Most economists are still wedded to the ‘traditional’ theory. I did additional work on the theory and measurement of cartel stability and concluded that the stability of a particular institution is an empirical matter that cannot be decided on theoretical grounds alone.

I then questioned the theory which leads to the conclusion that inventory accumulation and drawdown serve to stabilise production and prices and arrived at the finding that inventory accumulation tends to drive prices higher during periods of ‘shortage’, and more or less ‘permanently’ raises prices in a cartelised market. The jury is still out on this issue too.