Bachelor of Arts Harvard University, 1964. Master of Arts, Doctor of Philosophy University California Berkeley, 1966, 1970.
Assistant Professor of Economics, University Wisconsin-Madison, 1969-1973. Association Professor, Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University, 1973-1976, 1976-1978. Visiting Professor of Economics, Stanford University, 1977-1978.
Professor of Economics, University California San Diego, California, United States of America, since 1978. Foreign Co-editor, Review of Economic Studies, 1976-1979.
Discovery of the general class of mechanisms (Groves mechanisms) with the property that agents have an incentive to reveal truthfully their preferences among collective choices, thus enabling an optimal group choice to be made. Developed (with M. Loeb) a specific member of the class and solved the partial equilibrium ‘free rider’ problem with public inputs. Co-discovery (with J. Ledyard) of the first general equilibrium mechanism (the Groves-Ledyard mechanism) for solving the general ‘free rider’ problem with public goods.
The mechanism provides consumers with sufficient incentives to reveal their true preferences for public goods at an equilibrium. Recently, have been working on incentive mechanisms for optimal risk sharing, group-incentive compatible mechanisms, and incentives in the theory of planning.