Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian militant who founded Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and led al-Qaeda in Iraq after pledging allegiance to Osama bin Laden. His campaign in Iraq included bombings, hostage executions, and attacks on Shia targets that contributed to sectarian violence. He was killed in a U.S. airstrike near Baqubah on June 7, 2006.
Background
Born Ahmad Fadeel Nazal al-Khalayleh in Zarqa, Jordan, al-Zarqawi came from a poor family of Palestinian descent and Bedouin background. He grew up in the industrial town, about 27 kilometers north of Amman, with seven sisters and two brothers. Accounts of his father differ: he has been described as a retired army officer or a practitioner of traditional medicine. His father died when al-Zarqawi was young.
Career
In 1989, as Soviet forces were leaving Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi traveled there to join the mujahideen. Abu Qutaibah al-Majali recruited him. Rather than serving only as a fighter, he reported for the Islamist newsletter Al-Bonian al-Marsous, published in Arabic and Urdu from Hayatabad, near Peshawar; its title means “The Solid Edifice.” Ahmed Hashim attributed participation in the battles of Khost and Gardez to him. Al-Zarqawi spent about a decade mainly in and around Peshawar, became fluent in Pashto, and met the Salafi-jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in 1990. Al-Maqdisi became an important spiritual mentor. Their first encounters with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan were marked by tension: al-Zarqawi's criminal past and extreme use of takfir contributed to distrust, and he disagreed with bin Laden and Mahfouz Ould al-Walid about strategy and the priority given to fighting the United States.
Jordanian authorities arrested al-Zarqawi in 1992 after finding guns and explosives at his home. He was imprisoned until a general amnesty in 1999. In prison he tried to recruit cellmates to overthrow Jordan's rulers, became a forceful figure among inmates, issued fatwas, called himself sheikh, and memorized the Quran. He physically punished prisoners who violated his interpretation of Islamic rules, trained by lifting stones, and spent eight and a half months in solitary confinement. He also sent affectionate letters and drawings, including roses, to his mother and sisters. Jordanian officials and acquaintances said his beliefs became more radical in prison; journalist Fouad Hussein considered the imprisonment formative in his hostility toward police, judges, and officials, whom al-Zarqawi viewed as supporters of tyrannical regimes.
After his release, al-Zarqawi tried to revive Jund al-Sham and was implicated by Jordanian officials in a plan to bomb the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman before New Year's Day 2000. The plot was discovered, and he fled to Pakistan. After Pakistan revoked his visa, he crossed into Afghanistan and met bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders in Kandahar and Kabul. With approximately $200,000 in seed funding from bin Laden, he established a training camp in Herat in 1999 or 2000 and attracted Jordanian militants. Accounts differ over whether the camp served Jund al-Sham, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ), or both, or whether the groups were two names for one organization. The camp reportedly specialized in poisons, particularly ricin, and explosives. Al-Zarqawi chose Herat in part because recruits could enter Afghanistan from Iran and the site was distant from al-Qaeda's established operations in Kandahar and Jalalabad.
Al-Zarqawi was reportedly in Iran during the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. After the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan began in October, he returned to join Taliban and al-Qaeda forces resisting the coalition. He was wounded in late 2001; accounts differ on whether he suffered cracked ribs in a bombed house or a chest wound in a firefight. He left for Iran in December 2001 or early January 2002 and received treatment in Mashhad. Jordan requested his extradition, and reports said Iranian authorities restricted his activity to some extent. In 2001–2002, he activated the Abu Ali group, a Palestinian Islamist cell based in Essen, Germany, which provided logistical support and planned attacks on Jewish targets. German authorities arrested the cell in 2002 after intercepting communications with its leader, Mohammed Abu Dhess.
In 2001, al-Zarqawi allegedly sent his subordinate Abu Atiya from Herat to Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, an area used by Chechen separatists and transnational jihadist militants during the Second Chechen War. On February 5, 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell identified Atiya in a United Nations Security Council presentation as an instigator, acting at al-Zarqawi's direction, of European plots involving ricin and other weapons. A slide showed al-Zarqawi, Atiya, and three Jordanians from al-Zarqawi's hometown—Abu Ashraf, Abu Taisir, and Abu Hafs al-Urduni—as well as Menad Benchellali and Merouane Benahmed. The latter two were arrested in France in December 2002 and convicted in the Chechen Network case, which concerned links to Chechen jihadism through Pankisi. No ricin was found in Europe, and a substantive connection between Atiya and the Wood Green ricin plot in Britain was not established. Atiya later denied planning attacks in Europe.
Al-Zarqawi's locations and activities in 2002 were disputed. U.S. officials said he received medical treatment in Baghdad between March and May, or from May until late November; other accounts placed him in Syria. Jordanian court documents alleged that he began training fighters at a Syrian base during the summer of 2002 and that men from this group killed U.S. Agency for International Development official Laurence Foley outside Foley's Amman home on October 28. Two suspects confessed to Jordanian authorities that al-Zarqawi had armed and paid them, and he was sentenced to death in absentia. Unidentified Arab intelligence sources said he remained in Syria late that year and that Syria disregarded extradition requests from Jordan and the United States. Jordanian authorities also asked Saddam Hussein's Iraq to extradite him in connection with the failed millennium hotel plot. Competing accounts of his presence in Baghdad and of Iraqi government knowledge of him later became central to arguments about Iraq's relationship with al-Qaeda.
Before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Arab intelligence sources placed al-Zarqawi in eastern Iran planning resistance, while British intelligence reported that his network had established sleeper cells in Baghdad. In March, U.S. Special Activities Division personnel and the Army's 10th Special Forces Group worked with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Peshmerga during Operation Viking Hammer against Ansar al-Islam in northeastern Iraq. The operation inflicted heavy losses on the group and uncovered a chemical-weapons facility at Sargat, described as the only facility of its kind found in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi was part of Ansar al-Islam's leadership and was believed to have escaped into Iran during the assault.
After the invasion, al-Zarqawi returned to Iraq and coordinated the movement of foreign Islamist fighters entering through Syria. From autumn 2003, Arab Islamists moved steadily into Iraq, where many depended on his local contacts and intelligence network to plan attacks. He came to be regarded as a regional emir of Islamist militants in Iraq even before formally pledging allegiance to bin Laden. JTJ and later al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) carried out dozens of deadly attacks amid the disorder following the invasion. The network also claimed or was blamed for attacks in Morocco, Turkey, and Jordan, and for plots in Turkey and Jordan that were prevented. Al-Zarqawi targeted Shia mosques and civilians, Iraqi government institutions, United Nations representatives, foreign diplomats and civilians, hotel guests in Jordan, Egypt's ambassador, Russian diplomats, Christian churches, the Jordanian embassy, and U.S.-led coalition forces. He described many targets as apostates or infidels, as supporters of Israel, or as participants in the oppression of Muslims.
On August 19, 2003, the Canal Hotel bombing in Baghdad killed 22 people, including Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN secretary-general's special representative in Iraq. In March 2004, attacks on Shia shrines in Karbala and Baghdad killed more than 180 people; car bombings in Najaf and Karbala in December killed more than 60. Al-Zarqawi's organization was implicated in these attacks, though claims of his direct responsibility varied. A February 2004 letter attributed to him described the progress of the Iraqi jihad and proposed fighting groups he considered apostate; al-Qaeda denied authorship of the letter. In May 2004, the CIA identified al-Zarqawi as the masked executioner who beheaded American hostage Nicholas Berg in a video presented as retaliation for abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. In September, the CIA also identified him as the executioner of American civilian Olin Eugene Armstrong. U.S. officials attributed hundreds of killings, later rising into the thousands, to his network. The United States also believed he organized the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra to trigger Sunni–Shia violence.
Al-Zarqawi publicly opposed Western military forces in the Islamic world and Western support for Israel. In a January 2005 internet recording, he called democracy a false American claim, said that its acceptance of religious choice conflicted with God's rule, and declared participants in Iraq's January 30 election enemies of Islam. He called for an election boycott and threatened those who rejected it. In 2005, following an Iraqi government offensive against insurgents in the Sunni town of Tal Afar, he declared war on Iraqi Shias and dispatched suicide bombers against American soldiers and areas with large concentrations of Shia militias. He also took responsibility in audio and video messages for attacks and hostage executions. In an April 2006 video, a man identified as al-Zarqawi said fighters had resisted a three-year campaign, addressed President George W. Bush, and accused U.S. soldiers of taking drugs and sleep medication. The speaker rejected a truce offered by bin Laden and said the fight would continue. The U.S. Army later released an unedited recording emphasizing that al-Zarqawi appeared unable to clear a stoppage in a stolen M249 squad automatic weapon.
Al-Zarqawi's network sought to provoke a U.S. conflict with Iran. A document found in his safe house proposed exaggerating the Iranian threat to persuade the United States and Western countries that Iran endangered them, and outlined six ways to encourage war between the two countries. Some observers questioned the document's authenticity.
On December 17, 2004, the U.S. State Department designated al-Zarqawi and JTJ as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and ordered the freezing of any group assets in the United States. By May 2005 he was among the most wanted men in Jordan and Iraq; the United States offered $25 million for information leading to his capture, matching the earlier reward for bin Laden. On February 24, 2006, the FBI added him to its “Seeking Information – War on Terrorism” list, the first of its three principal wanted lists on which he had appeared.
Al-Zarqawi's relationship with al-Qaeda developed from contact and occasional cooperation into formal allegiance, while remaining contentious. Before the Afghan invasion, bin Laden repeatedly summoned him from Herat to Kandahar and sought his oath, but al-Zarqawi refused because he did not want to choose sides against the Northern Alliance and questioned the commitment of bin Laden and the Taliban. Saif al-Adel intervened to ease tensions and secure funds for al-Zarqawi's Herat camp. Al-Zarqawi's group differed with al-Qaeda over priorities: while bin Laden planned the September 11 attacks, al-Zarqawi was pursuing a campaign against Jordan's monarchy and Israel. German intelligence wiretaps later captured him objecting to members raising money in Germany for al-Qaeda's local leadership. Former al-Qaeda member Walid Khan also described disagreements between bin Laden and al-Zarqawi's group. Shadi Abdellah, arrested in 2002, told authorities that the two men were not as closely connected as had been believed. In April 2003, the CIA learned from a senior al-Qaeda detainee that bin Laden had repeatedly tried to recruit al-Zarqawi and that al-Zarqawi had rebuffed him over religious differences and disagreement with bin Laden's focus on the United States.
After al-Zarqawi returned to Iraq in or shortly before March 2003, bin Laden's military chief Saif al-Adel asked him to coordinate al-Qaeda operatives entering through Syria, and he agreed. A January 2004 letter intercepted by U.S. intelligence and made public the following month presented al-Zarqawi's group as a vanguard willing to serve under al-Qaeda if its leadership accepted attacks on groups the letter characterized as apostate; the letter also said disagreement would not end their cooperation. In October 2004, a JTJ spokesman announced that al-Zarqawi had pledged allegiance to bin Laden after eight months of messages and negotiations. JTJ became AQI, and al-Zarqawi was appointed its emir. On December 27, bin Laden called him the prince of al-Qaeda in Iraq in an Al Jazeera broadcast and asked members to obey him. In 2007, President Bush said a declassified intelligence report showed bin Laden had assigned al-Zarqawi in January 2005 to form a cell in Iraq to plan attacks outside the country and make the United States its principal target.
Al-Qaeda's central leaders and U.S. officials offered differing accounts of the alliance. Al-Zarqawi's attacks on Iraqi Shias upset al-Qaeda figures, and a 2005 letter from deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri warned that Muslim opinion was turning against him. Analysts said the central leadership could not control the tactics of its affiliates. In June 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said al-Zarqawi's connection to al-Qaeda might be ambiguous and that he could be a rival rather than bin Laden's lieutenant. A 2006 Senate intelligence report recounted that the CIA had assessed in April 2003 that al-Zarqawi planned and directed independent operations, without al-Qaeda's direction, while probably providing his network's services to al-Qaeda in return for financial and material assistance. The report also noted a detainee's claim that al-Zarqawi had rejected recruitment efforts. A National Intelligence Estimate declassified in September 2006 described al-Qaeda as exploiting the Iraq conflict through its merger with al-Zarqawi's network to recruit, attract donors, and sustain its leadership role. Experts observed that his prominence gave al-Qaeda a visible presence in Iraq after its original leaders were forced into hiding or killed, while the relationship remained fragile because of his focus on Shia targets.
U.S. officials connected al-Zarqawi with Saddam Hussein's Iraq before the invasion. On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the UN Security Council that al-Zarqawi had received treatment in Baghdad in May 2002, that extremists had converged there and coordinated people and supplies, and that Iraq had been asked to extradite him. Later investigations challenged important parts of this account. A late-2004 CIA report found no evidence that Saddam's government had arranged or even known of the treatment, and no conclusive evidence that it had sheltered al-Zarqawi. The 2006 Senate report concluded that Saddam's government had unsuccessfully tried to locate and capture him and had not maintained a relationship with him, sheltered him, or knowingly ignored his presence. A 2002 Iraqi intelligence letter ordered agents to watch for al-Zarqawi and another man, compare their photographs with those of Jordanian residents, and search hotels, apartments, and leased homes. Responses from Iraqi offices said they could not confirm that either man was in their areas. The letter appeared to have been sent to or from Trebil, on the Iraqi-Jordanian border.
Jordanian officials offered another account. A security official said documents recovered after Saddam's overthrow showed Iraqi agents had detained some of al-Zarqawi's operatives but released them after questioning. Jordanian officials said they had sent Iraq repeated requests to locate al-Zarqawi and information about his position, weapons, and cross-border movements, but received no useful response. King Abdullah II also said Saddam had rejected Jordan's requests for extradition. Another senior Jordanian intelligence official said al-Zarqawi traveled frequently to Iraq's Sunni Triangle after leaving Afghanistan, expanded his network there, and had no links to Saddam. Former Jordanian parliamentarian Layth Shubaylat, who knew both men, argued that al-Qaeda's religious militancy and Saddam's secular Ba'athist outlook were incompatible and said al-Zarqawi had rejected him in prison despite their shared Muslim faith. A 2006 Senate report cited an FBI interview with a senior Iraqi official who said Iraqi intelligence had arrested Abu Yasim Sayyem in early 2003 over suspected ties to al-Zarqawi and Foley's murder, then released him on Saddam's order. The official said the release made no sense if the Iraqi service were cooperating with al-Qaeda. The Senate report said the CIA later amended its assessment to conclude that the regime had not sheltered al-Zarqawi or his associates, while recognizing unresolved questions about treatment in Baghdad and other contacts.
Other intelligence material was disputed. A 2002 memo prepared by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith summarized sensitive reports alleging that al-Zarqawi had contacts with Iraqi intelligence to obtain weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air missiles, and might have been preparing Baghdad sleeper cells for a U.S. occupation. Officials later described those reports as old, uncorroborated, and based on sources of uncertain reliability. George Tenet wrote that al-Qaeda-affiliated extremists had converged on Baghdad in 2002 and found a secure environment for moving people and supplies, but said intelligence did not show Iraqi authority, direction, or control over particular terrorist attacks. The 2006 Senate report concluded that al-Zarqawi did not establish a link between Saddam and al-Qaeda.
Before the 2003 invasion, U.S. officials considered killing al-Zarqawi but did not proceed. NBC News reported that the Pentagon had proposed attacking his operation at least three times and that the National Security Council rejected the proposals while seeking an international coalition against Saddam. Former National Security Council member Roger Cressey said coalition-building took precedence over the policy of preemption against terrorists. Former CIA official Michael Scheuer said the United States declined opportunities to kill al-Zarqawi before the war because leaders did not want European governments to view the United States as acting recklessly. CENTCOM official Michael DeLong said a proposed strike on the Ansar al-Islam camp was abandoned because of concern that chemicals at the site might create a dangerous cloud; he said the Pentagon chose a ground operation instead. In his memoir, President Bush recounted discussions in summer 2002 about bombing a suspected poisons laboratory, saying Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice warned that a strike could disrupt coalition-building, and that he chose to continue diplomatic efforts.
(A compilation of more than 600 pages of al-Zarqawi's writ...)
Religion
Al-Zarqawi was a radical Islamist who memorized the Quran while imprisoned, issued religious edicts, and framed his campaign in terms of jihad and Islamic rule. His doctrine of takfir—declaring other Muslims heretics—was central to his justification of violence against Shia Muslims and others he regarded as apostates. His hard-line interpretation placed him within the Salafi-jihadi current, which sought to establish political order according to its strict reading of Islam and treated armed struggle as a means to that end.
Views
Al-Zarqawi's worldview treated armed jihad as a struggle against Western military power and governments he regarded as illegitimate. His doctrine of takfir extended the category of enemies to Muslims he considered apostates, particularly Shia communities and those participating in democratic institutions. In a 2005 recording he rejected democracy as a false system that conflicted with divine rule. His strategy was more uncompromising than that of al-Qaeda leaders who warned that attacks on Muslim civilians undermined popular support.
Personality
Al-Zarqawi was described by Saif al-Adel as physically sturdy, terse, spontaneous, and unwilling to compromise his beliefs. In prison, he combined authority and intimidation with religious discipline: he punished inmates he believed had violated Islamic principles and trained with stones to make himself appear more threatening. Toward his mother and sisters, however, he showed affection through letters and drawings.
Physical Characteristics:
Saif al-Adel described al-Zarqawi as sturdy.
Quotes from others about the person
Saif al-Adel characterized al-Zarqawi as a sturdy man who spoke briefly and spontaneously and would not yield on his convictions. Counterterrorism analyst Paul Wilkinson said that al-Qaeda figures were uncomfortable with his Iraqi tactics and that the central leadership could not control its affiliates' conduct. Other observers, including journalist Jill Carroll, regarded him as influential among insurgents. Other analysts and former associates disputed his leadership ability and the extent of his importance.
Connections
Al-Zarqawi married Umm Mohammed, a Jordanian woman who lived in Zarqa with their four children. Their son Musab was seven when al-Zarqawi died. Umm Mohammed urged him to leave Iraq temporarily and direct his deputies from outside the country; he refused, saying he would remain until victory or death.
His second wife, Isra, was Palestinian and 14 when he married her. She was the daughter of Yassin Jarrad, a Palestinian militant blamed for the 2003 killing of Iraqi Shia leader Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. Isra and al-Zarqawi had a child when she was 15; Isra and the child were killed in the airstrike that killed him. His third wife was Iraqi and might also have died in the strike. He was additionally said to have married a woman from a tribe near Peshawar.
Three of his seven sisters married men connected with jihadist militancy. One married Jordanian-Palestinian journalist Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami, who was close to Palestinian militant Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. Another married Khalid al-Aruri, a Jordanian-Palestinian militant and one of al-Zarqawi's close lieutenants in Afghanistan. A third married Afghan mujahideen veteran Haytham Mustafa Obeidat. Another named brother-in-law was Jordanian militant Iyad Nazmi Salih Khalil.
Father:
Fadeel Nazal al-Khalayleh
Described as either a retired army officer or a practitioner of traditional medicine.
Mother:
Um Sayel
Self:
Ahmad Fadeel Nazal al-Khalayleh
Birth name.
Wife:
Umm Mohammed
Lived in Zarqa with their four children.
Son:
Musab
Was seven years old when his father died.
Wife:
Isra
Palestinian and daughter of Yassin Jarrad; she and her child with al-Zarqawi were killed in the airstrike that killed him.
father-in-law:
Yassin Jarrad
Palestinian militant blamed for the 2003 killing of Iraqi Shia leader Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim.
brother-in-law:
Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami
Jordanian-Palestinian journalist close to Palestinian militant Abdullah Yusuf Azzam.
brother-in-law:
Khalid al-Aruri
Jordanian-Palestinian militant and one of al-Zarqawi's close lieutenants in Afghanistan.
Senate Reports Nos. 330-331
U.S. Senate report examining prewar intelligence on Iraq, including claims about al-Zarqawi and Saddam Hussein's government.