Background
Goldman, Alan H. was born on August 7, 1945 in New York City. Son of Lawrence I. and Florence (Goodman) Goldman.
(Do the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from ou...)
Do the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from our concerns and desires, or are there objective values in the world that we are rationally required to pursue and protect? Alan Goldman argues for the internalist or subjectivist view of practical reasons on the grounds that it is simpler, more unified, and more comprehensible than the rival objectivist position. He provides a naturalistic account of practical rationality in terms of coherence within sets of desires or motivational states, and between motivations, intentions, and actions. Coherence is defined as the avoidance of self-defeat, the defeat of one's own deepest concerns. The demand for coherence underlies both practical and theoretical reason and derives from the natural aims of belief and action. In clarifying which desires create reasons, drawing on the literature of cognitive psychology, Goldman offers conceptual analyses of desires, emotions, and attitudes. Reasons are seen to derive ultimately from our deepest occurrent concerns. These concerns require no reasons themselves but provide reasons for many more superficial desires. In defense of this theory, Goldman argues that rational agents need not be morally motivated or concerned for their narrow self-interest. Objective values would demand such concern. They would be independent of our desires but would provide reasons for us to pursue and protect them. They would require rational agents to be motivated by them. But, Goldman argues, we are not motivated in that way, and it makes no sense to demand that our informed and coherent desires be generally other than they are. We need not appeal to such objective values in order to explain how our lives can be good and meaningful. Reasons from Within will appeal to anyone interested in the nature of values and reasons, particularly students of philosophy, psychology, and decision theory.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199658277/?tag=2022091-20
( At the heart of aesthetics lie fundamental questions ab...)
At the heart of aesthetics lie fundamental questions about value in art and the objectivity of aesthetic valuation. A theory of aesthetic value must explain how the properties of artworks contribute to the values derived from contemplating and appreciating works of art. When someone passes judgment on a work of art, just what is it that is happening, and how can such judgments be criticized and defended?In this concise survey, intended for advanced undergraduate students of aesthetics, Alan Goldman focuses on the question of aesthetic value, using many practical examples from painting, music, and literature to make his case. Although he treats a wide variety of views, he argues for a nonrealist view of aesthetic value, showing that the personal element can never be factored out of evaluative aesthetic judgments and explaining why this is so. At the same time, he argues for certain common effects of highly esteemed artworks.Along the way Goldman considers such key topics as interpretation, representation, expression, and taste. His text will be a valuable contribution to the teaching of aesthetics as well as to the understanding of these topics on the part of students and scholars in philosophy and the arts.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0813320194/?tag=2022091-20
( This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empi...)
This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist, counteracting the recently dominant trend that rejects that framework entirely. Topics treated include the Gettier problem, the nature of explanation and inductive inference, the justification of foundations for knowledge in terms of inference to the best explanation, the possibility of realist interpretations of contemporary science, reference (as it bears on recent antirealist arguments), and the relations between empirical psychology and epistemology. Professor Goldman defends the need for a foundational theory of justification and presents a version that refutes standard criticisms of that doctrine. His defense of realism takes into account contemporary advances in semantics and philosophy of science. It attempts to clarify the kinds of skeptical argument the philosopher must take seriously, without succumbing to them. While recent epistemology has tended to dismiss the traditional foundational approach, it has not provided a suitable alternative. Goldman breaks new ground by adapting that approach within his explanationist, inductive theory.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0520076486/?tag=2022091-20
Goldman, Alan H. was born on August 7, 1945 in New York City. Son of Lawrence I. and Florence (Goodman) Goldman.
Bachelor, Yale University, 1967. Doctor of Philosophy, Columbia University, 1972.
Instructor Columbia University, New York City, 1970-1972. Assistant professor Ohio University, Athens, 1972-1974, University Idaho, Moscow, 1974-1976. Associate professor University Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, 1977-1981, professor, 1981—2002.
Visiting professor University Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1980. Visiting fellow University Colorado, Boulder, 1983, Princeton (New Jersey) University, 1976. Chairman philosophy department University Miami, since 1988.
Kenan professor College William & Mary, since 2002. Editor series in applied ethics Garland Publication, New York City, 1998.
(Do the reasons we have for acting as we do derive from ou...)
( This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empi...)
( At the heart of aesthetics lie fundamental questions ab...)
Philosophy and the Novel
(philosophy of novels and philosophy in novels)
2013Practical Rules
(When we need to obey rules and when we don't)
2002Moral Knowledge
(historical and contemporary perspectives)
1988Justice and Reverse Discrimination
1979Member American Philosophical Association (program committee 1990-1992).
Married Joan Roslyn Berkowitz, May 29, 1968. Children: Michael, David.