Alf Ross

June 10, 1899 (age 80)

Copenhagen, Capital Region of Denmark, Denmark

He is best known as one of the leading exponents of Scandinavian Legal Realism. He consequently worked in a barrister’s office. In 1923, he commenced a study tour, which would last for two and a half years, visiting France, England and Austria. He spent 1928–1929 in Uppsala, receiving a degree in philosophy in 1929 from the university. In 1935, he was appointed to teach at the University of Copenhagen in Constitutional Law. In 1953, Ross published Om Retired og Retfærdighed (which he would later publish in English, under the title On Law and Justice). In this book, he states that there is no a priori validity to give the law some special position. Experience serves as a guideline. This means, for example, that the famous dictum ‘suum cuique tribuere’, ‘to give to everyone his own’, has no meaning until it has been determined what actually belongs to someone, which means that this is a matter of begging the question (On Law and Justice, 64 (p 276)). His determination not to rely on anything but the facts leads to statements as the following: “The legal rule is neither true nor false. lieutenant is a directive.” (On Law and Justice, 2 (p 2)). Furthermore, the norm is directed at judges rather than citizens (On Law and Justice, 7 (p 33)). In this line of thought, he opposes natural law-approaches: “Like a harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone. And, indeed, how can it be otherwise, since the ultimate basis for every natural right lies in a private direct insight, an evident contemplation, an intuition. Cannot my intuition be just as good as yours? Evidence as a criterion of truth explains the utterly arbitrary character of the metaphysical assertions. lieutenant raises them up above any force of inter-subjective control and opens the door wide to unrestricted invention and dogmatics.” (On Law and Justice, 58 (p 261).).

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(Directives and Norms ) Author: Alf Ross Jun-2009

Directives and Norms by Alf Ross (2009-07-31)

The United Nations: Peace and Progress by Alf Ross

Constitution of the United Nations: Analysis of Structure and Function

(Ross, Alf. Constitution of the United Nations: Analysis o...)

Towards a realistic jurisprudence: a criticism of the dualism in law

Directives and Norms by Alf Ross (2009-06-30)

Directives and Norms

(Reprint of the first American edition. In Directives and ...)

Reprint of the first American edition. In Directives and Norms Ross asks whether imperatives (or, to use his term, 'directives') are subject to logic in the same way as indicatives. He shows the difference between indicative and directive discourse and explains the concepts 'directive' and 'norm' as they function in the social sciences, especially in the study of law. A contemporary essay in the Modern Law Review (32:544), though critical of this work, was still impressed by its "clear and convincing account" of these processes. SELECTED CONTENTS Preface I Introduction 1.Traditionally a distinction has been made between theoretical and practical discourse. It remains undecided, however, what the subject of this distinction is, and what is its foundation 3. Indicative and directive speech are distinguished. It is the aim of this study to explicate the concepts directive and norm on the basis of this distinction, and to help lay a foundation for deontic logic II Indicative Speech III Directive Speech 13. Directives which are impersonal and heteronomous are called quasi-commands. They include (1) legal rules; and (2) conventional rules (conventional morality, courtesy and decency) 15. Impersonal directives which are autonomous comprise the principals and judgments of personal morality IV The Concept of a Norm 21. A norm is to be defined as a directive which corresponds in a particular way to certain social facts V An Analysis of the Elements of a Norm 27. In a formalize language the directive operator is expressed by the word obligation. In legal language a number of other derivative modal expressions are used. Von Wright s assertion that permission cannot be defined as the negation of obligation is disputed 28. Comments on the table of legal modalities 29. It is possible to interpret the legal modalities in such a way that they have, to some extent, an application to non-legal normative discourse VI Deontic Logic 37. Following Weinberger, the principles of deontic logic are interpreted as postulates defining directive speech. Validity is not on an equal footing with truth but is derived from the concept of acceptance common to both ramifications of logic Index

The United Nations: Peace and progress

Towards a realistic jurisprudence; a criticism of the dualism in law

Alf Ross

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Education

Born in Copenhagen, Alf Ross graduated from high school in 1917. He studied law, graduating in 1922.

Career

He is best known as one of the leading exponents of Scandinavian Legal Realism. He consequently worked in a barrister’s office. In 1923, he commenced a study tour, which would last for two and a half years, visiting France, England and Austria.

He spent 1928–1929 in Uppsala, receiving a degree in philosophy in 1929 from the university.

In 1935, he was appointed to teach at the University of Copenhagen in Constitutional Law. In 1953, Ross published Om Retired og Retfærdighed (which he would later publish in English, under the title On Law and Justice).

In this book, he states that there is no a priori validity to give the law some special position. Experience serves as a guideline.

This means, for example, that the famous dictum ‘suum cuique tribuere’, ‘to give to everyone his own’, has no meaning until it has been determined what actually belongs to someone, which means that this is a matter of begging the question (On Law and Justice, 64 (p 276)).

His determination not to rely on anything but the facts leads to statements as the following: “The legal rule is neither true nor false. lieutenant is a directive.” (On Law and Justice, 2 (p 2)). Furthermore, the norm is directed at judges rather than citizens (On Law and Justice, 7 (p 33)).

In this line of thought, he opposes natural law-approaches: “Like a harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone.

And, indeed, how can it be otherwise, since the ultimate basis for every natural right lies in a private direct insight, an evident contemplation, an intuition. Cannot my intuition be just as good as yours? Evidence as a criterion of truth explains the utterly arbitrary character of the metaphysical assertions.

lieutenant raises them up above any force of inter-subjective control and opens the door wide to unrestricted invention and dogmatics.” (On Law and Justice, 58 (p 261).).