Background
Lapeyrere was born in Cateras-Lectourois in southwestern France, January 18, 1852.
government official military admiral
Lapeyrere was born in Cateras-Lectourois in southwestern France, January 18, 1852.
Lapeyrere entered the Naval Training College in 1869. After two years of combat in Tonkin, 1873-1875, he received his commission as ensign and spent the next years (1875-1880) on duty in the Atlantic.
Promoted to lieutenant in 1881, Lapeyrere returned to the Far East for his first independent command in 1884. A reputation as a brave, energetic and resourceful leader brought Lapeyrere rapid advancement. A commander in 1889, a captain in 1896, he was promoted rear admiral in 1902.
In 1908, after a decade of important posts in European waters, he rose to vice admiral and took charge of the Brest maritime district. The following year, he entered the government as minister of marine under Aristide Briand.
Lapeyrere's term as minister, 1909-1911, came in the midst of a rapid naval build-up. After decades of dispute and hesitation, the government and navy were launched on a program of fleet construction centered on modern battleships. Critics like Halpern have found Lapeyrere's policies inconsistent. He slowed the pace of battleship construction, thereby implying that French efforts in a future war would be applied to the less competitive waters of the Mediterranean. At the same time, the navy minister envisioned wartime operations centered in the north, that is, against the potent German High Sea Fleet. Halpern finds Lapeyrere's characteristic optimism and aggressiveness the most plausible explanation for the inconsistency.
In late 1911 Lapeyrere returned to duty with the fleet in the Mediterranean. The division of naval responsibilities between France and Britain in 1912 brought all of France's battleships to the Mediterranean theater, where Lapeyrere was commanding the French fleet. He brought impressive qualities to his post. A proven and confident combat leader, he lifted his battleships and cruisers to a high standard of readiness, despite such problems as unreliable gunpowder. His fleet was likely to perform superbly in the great surface battles conventional wisdom anticipated.
On the other hand, Lapeyrere had serious shortcomings. A war of battleships and cruisers constituted the limit of his imagination. His term as navy minister had also left its mark. He was unlikely to take orders gracefully, a fault the fuzzy lines of authority at the juncture between senior naval commanders and the minister of marine could not correct. A fine military technician, he shared the lack of sophistication in international affairs that marked France's senior admirals. Thus, he could confidently plan detailed offensives in the Mediterranean against both Italy and Austria-Hungary without concerning himself with whether both nations would in fact be his wartime opponents.
Lapeyrere's war plan received government approval in January 1914. It reflected the prevailing doctrine of the French navy, an offensive bent that is more commonly associated with the French army. The war was to begin with a vigorous offensive along the western coast of Italy. The Italian navy was to be met and defeated at once, before it could join the Austrian allies. French leadership, training, and elan - along with the immediate use of every available French warship - were to compensate for the numerical superiority of the Triple Alliance. With the Mediterranean turned into a French lake, the army's XIX Corps could pass safely from North Africa to fight on the continent. The insistence of General Joffre that the troops come at once, unescorted if need be, could be substantially satisfied, since the sea lanes would be swept quickly.
Events slipped out of this neat pattern. On August 2, Lapeyrere learned that Italy was not mobilizing; the war plan for a fleet action somewhere between Sicily and the Gulf of Genoa was useless. At the same time, word arrived of the dangerous German battle cruiser Goeben; it seemed within striking distance of the XIX Corps' sailing routes. Until August 8, in a dramatic reversal of his prewar planning, Lapeyrere guarded the troop ships. He ignored repeated orders from Paris to leave the transports and to send strong forces eastward to intercept the Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau. Lapeyrere's concern for the helpless troop ships was heightened by reports of other German war vessels off the coast of southern France and near the Canary Islands. He expected the Goeben to make a run for Gibraltar or the Adriatic; that it might head for Turkish waters, bringing momentous political consequences, apparently never entered his calculations.
After the dramatic opening days of hostilities, Lapeyrere remained in charge of French forces in the Mediterranean until October 1915. At least in principle, he held command over the British forces in the Mediterranean as well. It was a bitter and frustrating experience. From August 1914 to May 1915, Lapeyrere's central mission was to deal with the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic. He could not reach his enemy. The Austrians refused to come out to fight. French losses in the constricted waters of the Adriatic made proposals for a large Allied offensive unthinkable.
Thus, he could only blockade and conduct limited sorties. By the spring of 1915 even a close blockade meant offering easy victims to enemy submarines, and Lapeyrere's prized battleships pulled back to Malta and Bizerte. British forces in Egyptian waters and off the Dardanelles evolved into independent squadrons. The Dardanelles served as a particular burden. French battleships under Admiral Guépratte were ordered there in September 1914 by the government. Lapeyrere was deliberately excluded from subsequent planning of the Dardanelles operation. Minister of Marine Augagneur probably expected him to object strenuously to an unsupported naval attack. When word of the plan reached Lapeyrere, he was outraged at being circumvented.
Enemy submarines, Lapeyrere's nemesis in the Adriatic, became a general danger in the Mediterranean by the fall of 1915. It was the last straw. The lack of patrol vessels and the need to regulate merchant shipping were novel problems in a novel war Lapeyrere could no longer abide. He asked to be relieved, citing his poor health and his four years in command. The next year brought his retirement. Lingering concern over the Goeben episode led to a new government inquiry in 1918 (the first had taken place in 1914 in which Augagneur defended the old admiral. Lapeyrere died in Pau, near his birthplace, on February 16,1924.