Education
Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Harvard Kennedy School.
(With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe...)
With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reassess basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements. In a comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and forgoing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue. Glaser's provocative work is organized in three parts. "The Questions behind the Questions" evaluates the basic factual and theoretical disputes that underlie disagreements about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. "Alternative Nuclear Worlds" compares "mutual assured destruction capabilities" (MAD)--a world in which both superpowers' societies are highly vulnerable to nuclear retaliation--to the basic alternatives: mutual perfect defenses, U.S. superiority, and nuclear disarmament. Would any basic alternatives be preferable to MAD? Drawing on the earlier sections of the book, "Decisions in MAD" addresses key choices facing American decision makers.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691023123/?tag=2022091-20
Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Harvard Kennedy School.
He is the founding director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University"s Elliott School of International Affairs, as well as a professor of political science and international affairs Glaser"s research focuses on international relations theory and international security policy. He has contributed to the ideas of defensive realism, the security dilemma, the offense-defense balance, and arms races through various publications and articles
In Rational Theory of International Politics, he outlines three factors that affect a state"s security strategies: the material capabilities of a state, the information it has about the intentions and capabilities of other states, and the state"s motives.
Here, he distinguishes between motives that are "security-seeking" or "greedy." Glaser received a doctorate from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He also holds an Master of Arts in physics and an Master in Public Policy from Harvard University, as well as a Bachelor of Surgery in physics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Glaser was the Emmett Dedmon professor of public policy and acting dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago prior to George Washington University.
He has also taught political science at the University of Michigan and was a visiting fellow at Stanford University"s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He has served as a strategic analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, and was a peace fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, as well as a research associate at the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
(With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe...)
Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton University Press, 2010). William C. Wohlforth of Dartmouth College said that the book is "destined to be one of the most important books on international relations theory."
"Why unipolarity doesn"t matter (much)," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, v24 n2 (June 2011): 135-147.