Background
Damme, Eric E.C. van was born on July 27, 1956 in Terneuzen, The Netherlands.
(I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the ...)
I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and the applications that lend the refinements their validity. Although the guide to the applications is far from complete, the notes certainly allow the reader to form a good judgement of which refinements have really yielded new insights. Hence, as in the first edition, I will refrain from speculating on which refinements of Nash equilibria will survive in the long run. To defend this position let me also cite Binmore 1990 who compares writing about refinements to the Herculean task of defeating the nine-headed Hydra which grew too heads for each that was struck off. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to thank my secretary, Marjoleine de Wit, who skilfully and, as always, cheerfully typed the manuscript and did the proofreading.
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(This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classica...)
This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory (that of Nash equilibria) and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts (such as sequential, perfect, proper and stable equilibria) that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview for normal form games. The remaining chapters are devoted to specific applications, illustrating the strength (resp. weakness) of the various concepts.
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Damme, Eric E.C. van was born on July 27, 1956 in Terneuzen, The Netherlands.
Master of Science in Mathematics, Katholieke University Nijmegen, The Netherlands, 1979. Doctor of Philosophy in Technology Sciences, Technische University Eindhoven, The Netherlands, 1983.
Assistant professor Technology University, Delft, Netherlands, 1983, associate professor, 1984—1986, University Bonn, 1986—1990. Visiting assistant professor Graduate School Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1983—1984. Research professor CentER, Tilburg University, since 1989, director, 1990—1992, director graduate studies, 1991—1992, chairman board, 1993—1999, director Tilburg Law and Economics Center, since 2002.
Member supervisory board The Hague Institute Internationalization Law, Netherlands, since 2006. Member appeals committee NMA, The Hague, since 1999.
(This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classica...)
(I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the ...)
(2nd edition)
Fellow: Royal Academy Arts and Sciences, Econometric Society, European Economic Association. Member: Game Theory Society (secretary, treasurer 1998—2008).
Son of Robert van Damme and Julia van Grinberg. Married Suzan van Damme. Children: Jesoen, Jessica, Jean Paul.