Ambrose Everett Burnside was an American Union soldier. He was a Civil War Union Major General, Rhode Island Governor, and United States Senator.
Background
Ambrose Everett Burnside was born on May 23, 1824 at Liberty, Indiana, the son of Edghill and Pamelia (Brown) Burnside. His great-grandfather, Robert Burnside, came from Scotland to South Carolina about 1750; some of the later generations settled in Kentucky but his branch went to Indiana.
Career
At the time he was at college, however, his father was unable to give him further assistance as he was in moderate circumstances with a large family. Young Burnside was therefore apprenticed to a tailor and a year later with a partner opened a shop in Liberty. Shortly thereafter his father became a member of the state Senate of Indiana and through friends secured for his son an appointment to the United States Military Academy, which he entered July 1, 1843, and from which he graduated four years later, entering the army as a lieutenant of artillery.
He joined his battery in Mexico but was too late to see much active service. Before he resigned his commission in October 1853 he had served on the frontier and in garrison. While in the army he invented a breech-loading rifle and he resigned to engage in its manufacture. His last post was Fort Adams, Rhode Island, and at Bristol, Rhode Island, he formed a company to manufacture his new arm.
He had counted on the support of the government in his new venture, but in this he was disappointed, and in 1857 he was obliged to turn over his works to his creditors and begin life anew.
General McClellan, who was then connected with the Illinois Central Railroad, secured for him a position in its land department, and he was later made treasurer of the company.
In April 1861, at the request of the governor, he organized the 1st Rhode Island Regiment and became its colonel; it was among the first regiments to reach Washington. In the Bull Run campaign he commanded the brigade which opened that battle.
On August 6, 1861, he was commissioned brigadier-general of volunteers, and that autumn was engaged in organizing at Annapolis, Maryland, a division of New England troops for coastal operations. In January 1862 this force, with a fleet under the command of Flag Officer Goldsborough, sailed from Hampton Roads to Hatteras Inlet on the coast of North Carolina to secure a base of operations and destroy a small Confederate fleet in Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds.
The expedition was eminently successful. Roanoke Island, which had been fortified to prevent entrance into Albemarle Sound, was captured in February with 2, 600 prisoners and thirty-two guns. In March the Confederates were driven from their lines covering New Bern and that town occupied. Beaufort was next seized and Fort Macon, a permanent fortress on the coast, was besieged and taken in April.
In the meantime the Confederate fleet was captured and destroyed by the naval vessels. This completed the program of the expedition. Although one of the minor operations of the war, it excited great interest at the time. Burnside was commissioned major-general on March 18, and received a sword from Rhode Island and the thanks of the legislatures of Massachusetts and Ohio.
In July it was decided to withdraw some troops from both North and South Carolina and send them under Burnside to reinforce the Army of the Potomac. At this time he was offered the command of that army and declined.
When it was decided to withdraw the army from the vicinity of Richmond, Burnside's troops were sent to Pope, but as Burnside ranked Pope they went under the command of Reno.
Before the opening of the Antietam campaign Burnside was again offered the command of the Army of the Potomac but again declined. In the Antietam campaign he was assigned to the command of the right wing, consisting of the 1st Corps under Hooker and his own 9th Corps.
His command was in advance and was charged with the attack on the Confederate position on South Mountain where Lee planned to check the advance of the main Union column. This position was carried by the 16t and 9th Corps on September 14, 1862, and the Confederates retired across Antietam Creek.
In the advance from South Mountain, Hooker's corps was temporarily detached from Burnside's command and at Antietam was engaged on the extreme right while the 9th Corps was on the extreme left. Burnside accompanied the latter but refused to assume command as he still considered himself the commander of a unit composed of two corps. This militated against proper preparation for the coming battle.
The 9th Corps reached its position in the line on the night of September 15, and the following day should have been employed in making a careful reconnaissance of the creek in its front and in the preparation of a plan of attack. This was not done as Burnside did not consider himself in command, the corps staff was absent attending the funeral of General Reno, killed on the preceding day, and the senior division commander remained with his division as he considered Burnside the commander of the corps.
McClellan visited Burnside in person that day and assigned the duties to the various divisions, but he relied on Burnside to make the necessary reconnaissances. The consequence was that on the 17th, the day of the battle, much time was lost in attacking the strongest position of the enemy's defense at the Burnside bridge, which might easily have been turned by crossing the stream at a lightly guarded ford a mile below.
After the stream was crossed, about 1. 00 P. M. , the 9th Corps made a spirited attack, but it was too late to have the influence on the course of the battle that McClellan had expected. After the Confederate Army recrossed the Potomac there was a period of inaction during which the two armies were reorganized and re-equipped. Toward the end of October the Army of the Potomac crossed the river and advanced on Warrenton, Virginia.
En route, Burnside received the President's order assigning him to the command of the Army. It was a responsibility which he did not seek, for which he felt himself incompetent, but which he now felt it his duty to accept. When McClellan left the Army on November 10 the situation was as follows: the main body of the Army of the Potomac was in the vicinity of Warrenton with a cavalry screen some ten miles in advance; one corps and part of another were guarding the Potomac against operations from the Shenandoah Valley; the two Confederate corps were widely separated, Longstreet at Culpeper and Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley near Winchester with one division in the mountain pass on the road connecting the two towns.
Burnside was not long in deciding on his plan of operations and on November 9 sent it to General Halleck for the consideration of the President. It was to march the army to Fredericksburg where supplies were to meet him, cross the river on ponton bridges, and make a rapid march on Richmond. It was not the plan the President desired; he wanted Burnside to pursue the Confederate army.
On November 12 he sent Halleck to Burnside to confer with him.
Burnside adhered to his plan and gave practically the same reasons that induced Grant to move on a parallel line from Culpeper in 1864. On the Fredericksburg-Richmond line it would be easier to supply the army, the lines of supply would be more easily protected, and it was a shorter line.
Had the Army of the Potomac been equipped with mobile bridge trains as in 1864, the first phase of the operation, the concentration south of the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, would have been effected without difficulty, but unfortunately in 1862 the Army was not equipped with such trains. The bridge equipment of the Army was in charge of an engineer brigade with a depot in Washington, and at this time the available boats were in the two bridges over which the army had crossed the Potomac below Harper's Ferry.
Burnside knew that McClellan had issued an order on November 6 to have these bridges dismantled and the material taken to Washington where a mobile train was to be organized. On this order he based his plan, but he did not know that the order was delayed in transmission and was not delivered until November 12.
On November 14 Burnside received the following message from Halleck: "The President has just assented to your plan. He thinks it will succeed if you move rapidly, otherwise not. " Burnside immediately gave the order to start the movement on the following day, and at the same time had inquiries made of the commander of the engineer brigade as to the status of the ponton train.
On November 15 he learned that the last of the boats would reach Washington that day but that it would be several days before the train could start. Burnside was now confronted with the choice of adhering to his original plan and waiting for the pontons or of crossing the river above Fredericksburg by fords as Halleck had recommended to him.
On November 17 Sumner's grand division of two corps reached the north bank of the Rappahannock and finding no pontons but the river above still fordable, requested permission to cross over, but Burnside would not consent. Hooker's grand division arrived shortly after, and on November 19 he informed the Secretary of War that the fords were available and also requested permission to cross. Lee was early informed of the movement, and as the Union troops did not cross the river, Longstreet was started for Fredericksburg on November 18, and several days before the pontons arrived, he was in possession of the heights of Fredericksburg.
Toward the end of the month Jackson joined him and the armies faced each other across the river. From this situation there resulted the battle of Fredericksburg in which the Army of the Potomac crossed the river under the protection of its artillery, and on December 13 made a frontal attack on the Confederates in their well-chosen position, and was repulsed with heavy loss. On December 15 the Army was withdrawn across the river. To silence the rumors that he had been directed from Washington to make this attack, Burnside on December 17 in a manly letter to Halleck assumed the entire responsibility: "The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on this line, rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me responsible. "
In the latter part of the month Burnside decided to make an attempt to cross the river at the fords above Fredericksburg, but in a letter to the President said that none of his grand division commanders approved his plan. In his discouragement he wrote, "It is my belief that I ought to retire to private life. " After an interview with the President he wrote him that he had decided to carry out the plan, and inclosed the resignation of his commission to relieve the President of embarrassment should he not approve.
The President approved the plan and wrote that he could not yet see any advantage in a change of commanders of the army and in any case would not accept his resignation. The movement was begun in the latter part of January but had to be abandoned because of unfavorable weather. Burnside was opposed in his plans by General Hooker and others.
He decided that he must have a clear field if he retained the command so he prepared General Order No. 8, January 23, 1863, in which he dismissed from the United States Army General Hooker, General Brooks and General Newton, while two other major-generals, two brigadier-generals and a lieutenant-colonel were relieved from their duties and ordered to report to the adjutant-general at Washington. Burnside went to Washington and asked Lincoln either to sanction the order or to relieve him of the command. Lincoln relieved him and gave the command to General Hooker. Order No. 8 was never officially issued.
In March 1863 Burnside was assigned to the command of the Department of the Ohio which included the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Kentucky. It was Lincoln's great desire to send military protection to the loyal inhabitants of East Tennessee and he now proposed to reinforce the troops in Kentucky by the 9th Corps so that Burnside could advance on Knoxville when Rosecrans moved on Chattanooga.
On taking command of his department, Burnside learned that military operations had been greatly hampered by disloyal persons within the lines who gave information and aid to the enemy.
The most noted case that came under this order was that of Clement L. Vallandigham who had been a member of Congress from Ohio from May 1858 to March 1863 and had made himself conspicuous in that body by his attacks on the government from the beginning of the war.
On May 1, 1863, at Mount Vernon, Ohio, he made a speech in which he characterized Lincoln as a tyrant and reminded his hearers that "resistance to tyrants is obedience to God. " This speech the loyalty of Burnside for the President could not tolerate: Vallandigham was promptly arrested and when his appeal to the United States courts for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, he was tried by a military commission for "declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts to suppress unlawful rebellion. "
The commission found him guilty and sentenced him to be imprisoned until the close of the war, but the sentence was commuted by the President who directed that Vallandigham be sent to General Rosecrans to be passed through the lines to the Confederate Army in his front. Under this same General Order No. 38, on June 1, 1863, by Order No. 84, Burnside suppressed the Chicago Times and forbade the circulation of the New York World in his department.
By the President's direction this Order No. 84 was soon revoked. The advance into East Tennessee was delayed by various causes until the middle of August when Rosecrans maneuvered Bragg out of Chattanooga and Burnside advanced on Knoxville, which he entered on September 2; at Cumberland Gap on September 9 he received the surrender of the main Confederate force left in East Tennessee.
On the following day he was informed by Rosecrans that Bragg was in full retreat, and he immediately wrote the President that as the rebellion seemed pretty well checked he would like to resign his commission. The President, however, did not think it advisable to permit his resignation at that time. After the battle of Chickamauga, September 19-20, Bragg invested Chattanooga, held by Rosecrans, and early in November when Union reinforcements had reached there and Bragg gave up hope of capturing it, he decided to send Longstreet's veteran corps of the Army of Northern Virginia reinforced by a large body of cavalry to capture Burnside. Such a movement had been expected by the latter and he called up all his available forces from kentucky and fortified Knoxville to withstand a siege.
When Longstreet made his appearance in his front about the middle of November, Burnside had the option of abandoning the Tennessee Valley or of retreating to Knoxville.
He decided on the latter as he would thus, by drawing Longstreet so far north that he would be unable to return to take part in the battle, assist Gen. Grant who was preparing to attack Bragg as soon as sufficient troops had arrived. Burnside withdrew his troops to Knoxville in what Longstreet called a very cleverly conducted retreat, and there awaited the assault. The position was so strong that for ten days Longstreet could not make up his mind where to attack. In the meantime Grant had defeated Bragg in the battle of Chattanooga, November 24-25, and the latter was retreating. Immediately after the battle Sherman was directed to march to the relief of Knoxville and was en route when Longstreet made his assault on Nov. 29 and was repulsed.
On December 4, on the approach of Sherman, Longstreet raised the siege and moved eastward. Shortly thereafter Burnside turned over his command to his successor who had been appointed November 16 but was unable to reach Knoxville until after the siege. In preparation for the operations of 1864 it was decided to bring the 9th Corps back to the East and recruit it to full strength. This was work which it was felt could be best done by Burnside, and in January he was assigned to its command and the corps was reorganized at Annapolis, Maryland. It now consisted of four divisions, one of which was composed wholly of colored troops. The 9th Corps reinforced the Army of the Potomac as an independent unit under the command of Grant, and as such took part in the battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania.
After the latter battle, as Burnside consented to serve under his junior, General Meade, it was made a corps of the Army of the Potomac and as such took part in the battle of Cold Harbor and in the operations leading up to the investment of Petersburg. While Burnside was intrenched before Petersburg a mine was driven under the Confederate works in his front, and Grant determined to take advantage of the favorable opportunity to make a strong assault on the enemy's position.
The 9th Corps was to take the lead and to be supported by the corps on either side. The task assigned to the 9th Corps was one requiring fresh troops and able leadership. Unfortunately, with the exception of the colored division which had not hitherto been engaged, the corps had no fresh troops, and the commander of the division selected by lot to lead the attack proved hopelessly inefficient.
Burnside wanted to employ the colored division to lead but was overruled. The mine was blown up early on the morning of July 30 and produced a crater 150 feet long, 60 wide, and 25 deep, the Confederates abandoning the trenches for a considerable distance on either side. The leading division of the 9th Corps, which was to seize a ridge some 500 yards beyond the crater, got no farther than the crater itself and before other troops arrived the Confederates had recovered from their surprise.
The result was that the 9th Corps lost 4, 000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Meade held Burnside largely responsible and asked Grant for a court martial for him, which the latter refused. Meade then ordered a court of inquiry, which blamed Burnside for the failure. Shortly thereafter Burnside left the army on leave and was not recalled. Toward the close of the war he resigned his commission. In the years following his active service in the war, because of his experience as a leader and his reputation for integrity, Burnside was elected to important positions in railroad and other corporations.
In 1870 he was abroad on business connected with one of his corporations and while there became a voluntary and trusted medium of communication in the interests of conciliation between the French and Germans then at war. His death occurred at Bristol, Rhode Island, September 13, 1881.
Views
Quotations:
He issued his General Order No. 38 in which after giving a list of the acts considered treasonable, he said, "The habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will no longer be tolerated in this department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once arrested with a view to being tried as above stated or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends. "
Personality
Civil War General Ambrose Burnside was also known for his unusual style of facial hair, which included a bushy beard and moustache along with a clean-shaven chin. These distinctive whiskers—originally dubbed “burnsides”—later inspired the term “sideburns. ”
Due to his pleasing personality, genial manners, and the interest he showed in local military organizations, he made many friends. He made friends easily, smiled a lot, and remembered everyone's name.
Quotes from others about the person
Jeffry D. Wert, The Sword of Lincoln:
"He had been the most unfortunate commander of the Army, a general who had been cursed by succeeding its most popular leader and a man who believed he was unfit for the post. His tenure had been marked by bitter animosity among his subordinates and a fearful, if not needless, sacrifice of life. A firm patriot, he lacked the power of personality and will to direct recalcitrant generals. He had been willing to fight the enemy, but the terrible slope before Marye's Heights stands as his legacy. "
Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army;
". . Burnside had repeatedly demonstrated that it had been a military tragedy to give him a rank higher than colonel. One reason might have been that, with all his deficiencies, Burnside never had any angles of his own to play; he was a simple, honest, loyal soldier, doing his best even if that best was not very good, never scheming or conniving or backbiting. Also, he was modest; in an army many of whose generals were insufferable prima donnas, Burnside never mistook himself for Napoleon. Physically he was impressive: tall, just a little stout, wearing what was probably the most artistic and awe-inspiring set of whiskers in all that bewhiskered Army. He customarily wore a high, bell-crowned felt hat with the brim turned down and a double-breasted, knee-length frock coat, belted at the waist—a costume which, unfortunately, is apt to strike the modern eye as being very much like that of a beefy city cop of the 1880s. "