Gymnasium Philippinum, where Leo Strauss studied (1912–1917). Photo: Wodiga
College/University
Gallery of Leo Strauss
University of Hamburg, where Leo Strauss studied (Doctorate, until 1921). Photo: Merlin Senger
Gallery of Leo Strauss
University of Freiburg, where Leo Strauss studied. Photo: AlterVista
Career
Gallery of Leo Strauss
University of Cambridge, where Leo Strauss worked as temporary employee (1935). Photo: Diliff
Gallery of Leo Strauss
Columbia University, New York City, where Leo Strauss worked as research fellow, Department of History (1937–1938). Photo: Ajay Suresh from New York, NY, USA
Gallery of Leo Strauss
The University of Chicago, the school with which Strauss is most closely associated
Gallery of Leo Strauss
University of California, Berkeley, where Leo Strauss worked as visiting professor (1953). Photo: Gku
Gallery of Leo Strauss
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where Leo Strauss worked as visiting professor of philosophy and political science (1954–1955). Photo: Grauesel
Gallery of Leo Strauss
Claremont McKenna College, where Leo Strauss worked as professor of political science (1968–1969). Photo: Sdkb
Columbia University, New York City, where Leo Strauss worked as research fellow, Department of History (1937–1938). Photo: Ajay Suresh from New York, NY, USA
Strauss's study of philosophy and political discourses produced by the Islamic civilization—especially those of Al-Farabi (pictured) and Maimonides—was instrumental in the development of his theory of reading
Leo Strauss was a German-American political philosopher and historian of philosophy whose teaching and writings shaped twentieth-century political theory. Known for close readings of classical texts and his account of esoteric writing, he criticized modern relativism and argued for renewed engagement with ancient political philosophy and enduring questions of reason, revelation, justice, and political authority.
Background
Strauss was born in Kirchhain, in Hesse-Nassau, then a province of the Kingdom of Prussia within the German Empire. His parents were Hugo Strauss and Jennie (née David) Strauss. The family was Jewish and maintained a conservative, even Orthodox household, with strict observance of ceremonial laws, although Strauss later recalled that they knew little about Judaism beyond those practices.
His father and uncle operated a farm-supply and livestock business inherited from their father, Meyer Strauss (1835–1919), a prominent member of Kirchhain's Jewish community.
Education
Strauss attended the Kirchhain Volksschule and the Protestant Rektoratsschule before entering the Gymnasium Philippinum in nearby Marburg in 1912. He graduated in 1917. While at school, he boarded with a local cantor named Strauss, who was no relation; the cantor's home was a meeting place for followers of the neo-Kantian philosopher Hermann Cohen. The gymnasium had also been attended by Johannes Althusius and Carl Joachim Friedrich.
Strauss served in the German army during the First World War from July 5, 1917, to December 1918. After the war he attended courses at the universities of Freiburg and Marburg, including classes taught by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. He earned a doctorate at the University of Hamburg in 1921. Ernst Cassirer supervised his dissertation, On the Problem of Knowledge in the Philosophical Doctrine of F. H. Jacobi (Das Erkenntnisproblem in der philosophischen Lehre Fr. H. Jacobis).
During his student years Strauss joined a Jewish fraternity and worked in the German Zionist movement. He encountered German Jewish intellectuals including Norbert Elias, Leo Löwenthal, Hannah Arendt, and Walter Benjamin; Benjamin remained an admirer of Strauss and his work. Jacob Klein was his closest friend. Strauss also engaged intellectually with Gerhard Krüger, Karl Löwith, Julius Guttmann, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Franz Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem, Alexander Altmann, and the Arabist Paul Kraus. He dedicated his first book to Rosenzweig.
Strauss began his academic career as a research assistant at the Higher Institute for Jewish Studies in Berlin, where he worked from 1925 to 1932. In 1932 he received a Rockefeller Fellowship in social science and left the institute for Paris. The fellowship supported work in France and England during 1932–1934. He returned to Germany only once, for a few days, about twenty years later.
After the Nazi rise to power he chose not to return to Germany. In Paris he married Marie (Miriam) Bernsohn, a widow he had known in Germany, and adopted her young son, Thomas. He found temporary employment at the University of Cambridge in 1935 through the help of his in-law David Daube, who was affiliated with Gonville and Caius College. In England Strauss became a close friend of R. H. Tawney and was on less friendly terms with Isaiah Berlin. Unable to find permanent employment there, he moved to the United States in 1937 with help from Harold Laski, who made introductions and helped him obtain a short-term lectureship. After a brief research fellowship in Columbia University's Department of History, Strauss joined the political science faculty of the New School for Social Research in 1938. He served there as lecturer, associate professor, and professor until 1948, also holding adjunct appointments. In 1939 he was a visiting professor at Hamilton College for a short term. He became a naturalized United States citizen in 1944.
In 1949 Strauss became professor of political science at the University of Chicago, where he held the Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service Professorship until 1969. His seminars influenced several generations of political theorists, many of whom later held prominent academic posts. Some of his students and interlocutors became associated with the neoconservative movement, while his ideas were also debated in political theory, classics, intellectual history, and religious studies. He was a visiting professor at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1953 and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1954–1955. In 1954 he met Karl Löwith and Hans-Georg Gadamer in Heidelberg and delivered a public address on Socrates. He declined a temporary lectureship in Hamburg in 1965 for health reasons.
In 1965 Strauss received an honorary doctorate from the University of Hamburg and the German Order of Merit, presented through the German representative in Chicago. He taught at Claremont Men's College in California in 1968–1969, then moved to St. John's College in Annapolis. From 1969 he was Scott Buchanan Distinguished Scholar in Residence there, serving until his death.
Strauss's scholarship ranged from Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon to Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche, and medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy, particularly Al-Farabi and Maimonides. He argued that the modern turn in philosophy began with Machiavelli and broke decisively with classical understandings of politics and the good life. He held that historicism, relativism, scientism, and nihilism had contributed to a crisis in modern thought, and proposed renewed study of classical political philosophy as a way to recover questions about human nature, justice, and the good life.
Strauss held that politics and philosophy are necessarily intertwined, although their ends cannot be reduced to one another. He regarded the trial and death of Socrates as a defining moment in political philosophy. Socrates' argument that inquiry into nature must consider human nature connected with Aristotle's description of human beings as political animals. Strauss distinguished scholars, who approach major problems cautiously and indirectly, from great thinkers, who address them boldly and creatively; he identified himself as a scholar.
In Natural Right and History, Strauss began by criticizing Max Weber's epistemology, then considered relativism and the development of natural-right theories through Hobbes and Locke, before criticizing Rousseau and Edmund Burke. The book also draws on Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Strauss regarded Weber as a serious and noble mind but a derivative thinker influenced by Nietzschean relativism. He argued that a supposed separation of facts from values cannot justify itself without making a value judgment, and that positivism likewise cannot establish its own validity without a value commitment. He wrote that Heidegger's thought had to be confronted before a complete modern political theory could be formulated, requiring political thought to engage ontology and the history of metaphysics.
Strauss considered Nietzsche the first philosopher to understand historicism properly. He presented Nietzsche's view that inherited principles, including belief in progress, could become alien and unconvincing, leaving the apparent choice of a life-giving delusion over a deadly truth. Strauss criticized Heidegger for, in his view, sanitizing and politicizing Nietzsche, while Heidegger treated Nietzsche's tragic nihilism as a myth shaped by a defective Western conception of Being that he traced to Plato. In published correspondence with Alexandre Kojève, Strauss agreed with Hegel's premise that an end of history would entail an end to philosophy as understood by classical political philosophy.
Strauss first called in the late 1930s for renewed attention to the distinction between public and secret teaching. In Persecution and the Art of Writing (1952), he argued that serious writers sometimes composed texts with layered meanings, using irony, paradox, obscure references, or apparent contradictions. Such strategies could protect philosophers from political retaliation and protect political society from philosophy's corrosive effects; they could also attract readers capable of careful interpretation and make reading itself an exercise in philosophical reasoning. Drawing on Maimonides, Al-Farabi, and Plato's Phaedrus, Strauss maintained that classical and medieval texts could guide readers toward independent thought rather than simply transmit conclusions.
He did not describe esoteric writing as merely a public doctrine for the many paired with a secret doctrine for a few. Rather, rhetorical strategies could convey a text's central meaning tacitly, beyond its literal or historical surface. Following Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Strauss held that ancient and medieval thinkers adapted their wording to prevailing moral expectations, particularly when authorities could condemn heterodox ideas as heresy or injustice. He argued that those regarded as righteous guardians of morality could be especially inclined to persecute writers who challenged the political foundations of their authority. In Strauss's account, close reading allows readers to join a “great conversation” among philosophers across generations.
Strauss's account of political thought distinguished ancient and modern approaches and connected them with the tension between Athens and Jerusalem, or reason and revelation. The Socratic tradition brought philosophy back to human concerns and the political marketplace; modern thought began with Machiavelli and later thinkers. Strauss argued that modern thinkers reacted against medieval revelation by emphasizing reason. In his account, Thomas Aquinas's combination of natural right and natural theology made natural right vulnerable to theological disputes, while Hobbes, influenced by Francis Bacon, redirected political thought toward human physical hopes and fears. Strauss connected that approach with Locke and later economic thought in David Hume and Adam Smith.
In interpreting Plato's Republic, Strauss rejected the view that it was simply a program for political reform, reading it instead as an inquiry into the nature of political things. He argued that the city in speech was unnatural and made possible by abstraction from eros. Though skeptical of inevitable progress, he was also wary of projects promising a return to an earlier order. He feared attempts to impose a future world state, which he thought could become tyrannical, and kept his distance from both fascism and communism.
Strauss's encounter with Carl Schmitt began with Schmitt's favorable discussion of Strauss's early work on Hobbes; that support helped him obtain fellowship funding that enabled him to leave Germany. Strauss criticized Schmitt's The Concept of the Political and, in 1932 correspondence, summarized Schmitt's political theology as resting on the idea that human beings are naturally evil and can be unified only against other people. Heinrich Meier interpreted Strauss's critique and clarifications as prompting substantial changes in Schmitt's second edition, while Robert Howse argued that clear evidence for this account is lacking and that their relationship was professional. Strauss believed Schmitt and his return to Hobbes clarified modern political self-understanding, but considered Schmitt's political theology inadequate. He argued instead for a broader classical conception of human nature and political philosophy.
Strauss's lifelong philosophical friendship with Alexandre Kojève included a dispute about philosophy's place in politics. Kojève, a senior French government official involved in creating the European Economic Community, argued that philosophers should actively shape political events. Strauss held that their political role should be limited chiefly to securing philosophy's freedom from political intervention. Kojève later said that without his friendship with Strauss he would not have known what philosophy was. Strauss was also on friendly terms with Raymond Aron and Étienne Gilson.
Strauss challenged Karl Popper's interpretation of Plato's Republic as a blueprint for regime reform. Eric Voegelin responded to Strauss's request to examine Popper's argument with a sharply critical letter, describing Popper as unable to reproduce Plato's argument accurately. Strauss showed the letter to Kurt Riezler, who used his influence to oppose Popper's appointment at the University of Chicago.
In 1953 Strauss coined “reductio ad Hitlerum,” a play on reductio ad absurdum for the fallacy of dismissing an argument through an irrelevant comparison with Hitler or the Nazi regime. In 1965 he also publicly challenged a National Review writer's characterization of Israel as racist, arguing that the claim lacked sufficient evidence and recognizing Zionism's conservative function in resisting the erosion of ancestral distinctions.
Strauss's teaching and writings became influential beyond his own appointments. The methods and pedagogical style associated with Straussianism emphasize close reading of major works, an effort to understand a thinker as that thinker understood himself, and openness to the possibility that earlier philosophers may have grasped truths later thinkers missed. Practitioners tend to resist accounts that treat past philosophy as merely superseded by its historical setting; the approach has been compared with New Criticism in literary study. Disputes concern what makes a book “great” and whether its author can be separated from the general thinking of the period. Harvey Mansfield described a Straussian school as open to philosophy as a whole and without a fixed doctrine, while maintaining that Straussianism is not itself a single doctrine.
Strauss's work was translated widely into Chinese, and a Chinese Straussian school developed, with Liu Xiaofeng of Renmin University and Gan Yang among its prominent figures. Some Chinese Straussians also took an interest in Carl Schmitt. The reception of both thinkers in Chinese-speaking settings has been discussed as an example of Western political theory adapted in a non-Western context and as a means of examining tensions in Western modernity and the dilemmas of non-liberal societies.
Strauss's critics accused him of elitism, illiberalism, and hostility to democracy. Seymour Hersh argued that Strauss endorsed “noble lies” used by leaders to maintain social cohesion. In The City and Man, Strauss discussed myths in Plato's Republic, including claims that a state's land belongs to it even if acquired illegitimately and that citizenship rests on more than the accident of birth. Shadia Drury argued in Leo Strauss and the American Right (1999) that Strauss fostered an elitist tendency among American leaders associated with imperialist militarism, neoconservatism, and Christian fundamentalism, and interpreted his work as endorsing deception and strong rule. Steven B. Smith rejected a connection between Strauss and neoconservative programs, arguing that Strauss was not politically active, did not endorse imperialism, and questioned political philosophy's usefulness for policymaking. Smith read Plato's philosopher-king as a reductio ad absurdum and emphasized Strauss's defense of philosophy's autonomy; Robert Alter praised Smith's account as a persuasive correction of claims about Strauss's politics.
Strauss's anti-historicism also drew criticism. Claes G. Ryn argued that it created an artificial opposition between moral universality and the conventional, ancestral, and historical, and that Strauss wrongly assumed respect for tradition must undermine reason. Ryn maintained that historical understanding can be indispensable to apprehending universality and that Strauss's abstract account of natural right distorted how universal principles become known in particular historical forms. He connected Strauss's influence on American conservatives, including Catholic thinkers, with a rejection of tradition that conflicted with the Christian idea of the Incarnation as a joining of the universal and historical. Ryn further argued that abstract universalism contributed to neoconservative support for American intervention abroad. Paul Gottfried compared what he called neoconservative philosophy's “new Jacobinism” with the rhetoric of Louis Antoine de Saint-Just and Leon Trotsky, criticizing its influence on the American right.
Strauss's defenders and interpreters disputed these accounts. Peter Minowitz's Straussophobia (2009) criticized Drury, Xenos, and other opponents. Jenny Strauss Clay rejected the portrayal of her father as the mastermind behind neoconservative foreign-policy figures, saying that he was conservative insofar as he did not assume change was necessarily improvement; she added that he would have questioned a right-leaning academic consensus as well. Mark Lilla argued that associating Strauss with neoconservative policies conflicted with careful reading of his texts and stressed his concern that tyranny threatens political decency and philosophical life. Nathan Tarcov, responding to claims that Strauss's teaching encouraged military promotion of liberal democracy, emphasized that Strauss identified enduring political problems rather than supplying policy solutions. Debates over Strauss's interpretation of ancient texts, his approach to historical context, and the political implications of his students' work remain part of his scholarly reception.
Strauss died of pneumonia in Annapolis on October 18, 1973. Psalm 114 was read at his funeral at the request of family and friends. He was buried in Annapolis Hebrew Cemetery beside Miriam, who died in 1985.
Developed an influential interpretation of classical political philosophy and the claim that philosophical writers in many periods used esoteric or layered writing, shaping debate in political theory, classics, intellectual history, and religious studies.
Through teaching and seminars at the New School and the University of Chicago, trained generations of political theorists, many of whom later became influential scholars at major American universities.
Coined “reductio ad Hitlerum” in 1953 for the fallacy of dismissing an argument through an irrelevant comparison with Hitler or the Nazi regime.
Works
article
Maimonides' Statement on Political Science
(Strauss's article in the Proceedings of the American Acad...)
1953
On Collingwood's Philosophy of History
(Strauss's review in the Review of Metaphysics.)
1952
On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political Philosophy
(Strauss's article in Social Research.)
1946
On the Intention of Rousseau
(Strauss's article in Social Research.)
1947
book
Gesammelte Schriften
(Collected writings edited by Heinrich Meier; the multivol...)
2001
Reorientation: Leo Strauss in the 1930s
(Collection containing critical editions of Strauss's writ...)
2014
The Predicament of Modern Politics
(Howard Spaeth's collection included Strauss's essays “The...)
1964
Social Research
(Journal containing Strauss's 1939 essay “The Spirit of Sp...)
Note on the Plan of Nietzsche's “Beyond Good & Evil”
(Strauss's note on Nietzsche, issued by St. John's College.)
1971
Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee
1965
essay
Political Philosophy and the Crisis of Our Time
(Adaptation of Strauss's essays published in The Predicame...)
1972
How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed
(Strauss's contribution to The Guide of the Perplexed, Vol...)
1963
Comments on Carl Schmitt's Begriff des Politischen
(English translation of Strauss's 1932 critical essay on S...)
1965
On the Plan of the Guide of the Perplexed
(Strauss's essay in the Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume.)
1965
Farabi's Plato
(Essay published in the Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume.)
1945
The Crisis of Our Time
(Essay included in The Predicament of Modern Politics.)
1964
The Crisis of Political Philosophy
(Essay included in The Predicament of Modern Politics.)
1964
The Literary Character of The Guide for the Perplexed
(Essay included in Persecution and the Art of Writing.)
1952
'Relativism'
(Strauss's essay in Relativism and the Study of Man.)
1961
Notes on Maimonides' Book of Knowledge
(Strauss's contribution to a collection honoring G. G. Sch...)
1967
The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon
(Strauss's essay published in Social Research.)
1939
How to Study Medieval Philosophy
(Strauss's essay published in Interpretation.)
1996
lecture
On German Nihilism
(Lecture first delivered in 1941 and later published in In...)
1999
Existentialism
(Public lecture on Heidegger's thought, originally deliver...)
1995
Religion
Strauss was raised in a conservative, even Orthodox Jewish home. He recalled that the household knew little about Judaism beyond strict observance of ceremonial laws, though it did not fully embrace Orthodox practice. His father and uncle operated a farm-supply and livestock business inherited from their father, Meyer, a leading member of Kirchhain's Jewish community.
Strauss treated the relation between reason and revelation as a permanent philosophical question. He rejected what he regarded as dogmatic disbelief as intemperate and irrational, but was neither an orthodox believer nor a convinced atheist. He held that revelation must be examined by reason and that belief and unbelief remain defensible possibilities. In Natural Right and History, he contrasted Socratic accounts of divinity with conventionalist and materialist interpretations, arguing that questions of religion cannot be separated from civil society and political authority.
His studies of medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophy, especially Maimonides and Al-Farabi, informed his examination of how philosophical inquiry and revealed faith might be reconciled without erasing their differences. He considered the question of God enduring and invited readers of The City and Man to remain open to it. Scholars have differed over whether he treated religion instrumentally or preserved orthodoxy as a live possibility.
Politics
Strauss was not a party politician. As a teenager he joined a German Zionist youth group and, at seventeen, became a follower of Ze'ev Jabotinsky and political Zionism. He wrote about controversies within the movement but left its organized activity by his early twenties. He later called political Zionism problematic while retaining a sympathetic interest; he credited it with a conservative moral function because it resisted the leveling of inherited differences. In a letter to a National Review editor, he challenged an accusation that Israel was racist for lacking sufficient evidence and concluded that Zionism had helped counter what he called progressive leveling.
His political thought criticized modern liberalism for making universal individual liberty its highest end while, in his view, weakening moral and spiritual foundations and the authority of religion, tradition, and natural law. He contrasted this outlook with classical concern for human excellence and political virtue. He associated relativism, historicism, scientism, and value-free social science with a crisis in political judgment, arguing that political inquiry cannot avoid questions of human nature, morality, and justice.
Strauss characterized the permissive, value-neutral culture of Western liberal democracies as a form of “gentle” nihilism, distinct from the coercive nihilism of Nazi and Bolshevik regimes, which sought to destroy inherited traditions, history, ethics, and moral standards and replace them by force. He opposed fascism and communism, and feared that attempts to impose a final political settlement or a world state could end in tyranny. His political stance and the later political influence attributed to some of his students have remained subjects of academic debate.
Views
Strauss's philosophy centered on criticizing modernity and recovering classical political philosophy. He argued that modern philosophy, beginning with Machiavelli and reaching historicism and relativism, broke with classical accounts of politics and the good life. He believed modern political and social sciences, when grounded in empirical observation and rational analysis alone, failed to grasp fundamental questions of human nature, morality, and justice, reducing people to objects of calculation and manipulation. His critique of Weber and positivism held that value-free inquiry cannot justify itself without making a value judgment.
He distinguished ancient political philosophy, associated with Socrates and his heirs, from modern thought. Socrates' insistence that inquiry into nature must consider human nature, which Aristotle called political, brought philosophy back to human and civic concerns. Strauss regarded Socrates' trial and death as a central moment in political philosophy. He held that politics and philosophy are inseparable yet have ends that cannot be collapsed into one another. In his distinction, scholars cautiously and indirectly address major problems, while great thinkers confront them boldly and creatively.
The tension between Athens and Jerusalem—reason and revelation—was a lasting theme. Strauss studied medieval Jewish and Islamic philosophers, especially Maimonides and Al-Farabi, who combined fidelity to revealed religion with rational inquiry. He viewed the relation between philosophy and theology as a continuing problem. The question of religion, he argued, is inseparable from the nature of civil society and civil authority.
Strauss's method stressed close reading of classical texts. He argued that writers facing political or religious danger sometimes used layered meanings, irony, paradox, allusion, hyperbole, or apparent contradiction to communicate to attentive readers. Such writing could protect an author from persecution, limit harm to political society, and make interpretation itself an exercise in philosophical reasoning. He did not present the method as a simple division between an overt doctrine for the many and a secret doctrine for the few; a reader had to examine rhetorical structure to grasp a text's tacit argument. Classical and medieval thinkers, in his account, participated in a continuing “great conversation.”
Strauss's natural-right theory opposed the view that political judgment could be made without substantive standards. Natural Right and History examines Hobbes and Locke, criticizes Rousseau and Burke, and draws on Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Strauss argued that Heidegger's thought had to be confronted in any adequate modern political theory. He regarded Nietzsche as the first philosopher to understand historicism properly, criticized Heidegger's treatment of Nietzsche, and maintained in correspondence with Kojève that Hegel's end of history would imply the end of philosophy in its classical political form.
He contrasted classical concern for excellence and political virtue with modern liberalism's emphasis on universal individual liberty. He worried that liberal democracy could become morally aimless if it abandoned substantive judgments, describing its permissive value-neutrality as “gentle” nihilism. He distinguished this from the brutal nihilism of Nazi and Bolshevik regimes, which used force to replace inherited history, ethics, and moral standards. He was skeptical both of inevitable-progress theories and of efforts to restore an earlier political order, and wary of a world state that might become tyrannical.
In his reading of Plato's Republic, Strauss rejected the idea of a blueprint for regime reform. He treated it as an inquiry into political things and argued that the city in speech depended on abstraction from eros. He was suspicious of claims to have finally resolved enduring political or philosophical disputes, including the tension between rationalism and traditionalism.
Strauss's dialogue with Carl Schmitt concerned political association and authority. He thought Schmitt's return to Hobbes clarified modern political self-understanding, but rejected the idea that a political community is adequately explained as a unity directed against outsiders. His dispute with Kojève concerned whether philosophers should actively shape political events: Kojève supported such involvement, while Strauss held that philosophy needed protection from political intervention.
Strauss's views on Zionism shifted from youthful political participation to a critical but sympathetic assessment. He regarded Zionism as problematic but credited it with conserving inherited distinctions against leveling. He also resisted the idea that political philosophy could supply straightforward policies for contemporary affairs, emphasizing instead its task of clarifying permanent questions.
Personality
Quotes from others about the person
Walter Benjamin admired Strauss and his work throughout his life. Hans-Georg Gadamer said that he largely agreed with Strauss's interpretations. Alexandre Kojève credited his friendship with Strauss with helping him understand philosophy. Harvey Mansfield characterized the Straussian school as open to philosophy as a whole and lacking a required set of doctrines.
Strauss's political influence has been interpreted in sharply different ways. Shadia Drury associated his teaching with elitism and the American right, while Steven B. Smith argued that Strauss was not politically active, did not endorse imperialism, and defended philosophy's autonomy from politics. Jenny Strauss Clay rejected the portrayal of her father as the architect of neoconservative foreign policy. Mark Lilla likewise argued that such an attribution conflicts with Strauss's texts, while Nathan Tarcov stressed that Strauss identified enduring political problems rather than supplying ready-made policy solutions.
Seymour Hersh accused Strauss of endorsing political “noble lies.” Claes G. Ryn argued that Strauss's anti-historicism set up an artificial opposition between universal moral principles and historical tradition. Paul Gottfried criticized what he considered the influence of Straussian ideas on the American right. These judgments reflect continuing disagreement about the meaning and political implications of Strauss's scholarship.
Interests
As a teenager Strauss joined a German Zionist youth group, followed Ze'ev Jabotinsky, and wrote about controversies within the movement. He left organized Zionist activity by his early twenties but retained a sympathetic, critical interest in Zionism.
Connections
Kraus married Strauss's sister Bettina; after the couple died in the Middle East, Strauss and his wife adopted their child.
Strauss married Marie (Miriam) Bernsohn, a widow he had known in Germany, in Paris. He adopted her son, Thomas. Strauss and Miriam had no biological children of their own. They later adopted Jenny, the daughter of Strauss's sister Bettina and Paul Kraus, after both parents died. Jenny became a professor of classics at the University of Virginia and was also known as Jenny Strauss Clay. Strauss was survived by Thomas, Jenny, and three grandchildren.
Jacob Klein was Strauss's closest friend. His intellectual associates included Gerhard Krüger, Karl Löwith, Julius Guttmann, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Franz Rosenzweig, Gershom Scholem, Alexander Altmann, and Paul Kraus. Strauss's friendship and intellectual exchanges with Walter Benjamin began during their Berlin student years; Benjamin remained an admirer. Strauss dedicated his first book to Rosenzweig. He corresponded vigorously with several friends and intellectual associates, and many exchanges were later collected in Gesammelte Schriften.
He became close to R. H. Tawney while in England and had a less friendly relationship with Isaiah Berlin. His correspondence with Carl Schmitt ended after Schmitt did not answer his letters. David Daube, Strauss's in-law, helped him obtain temporary work at Cambridge; Harold Laski helped him secure academic introductions in the United States. Ernst Cassirer supervised Strauss's doctoral dissertation, and Strauss attended courses taught by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.
Strauss's exchanges with Eric Voegelin, Kurt Riezler, and Karl Popper arose from disagreement over Popper's interpretation of Plato. His daughter Jenny Strauss Clay later defended him against claims that he directed neoconservative policy.
Father:
Hugo Strauss
Operated a farm-supply and livestock business with his brother.
Mother:
Jennie (David) Strauss
Born Jennie David.
Grandfather:
Meyer Strauss
Lived from 1835 to 1919 and was a prominent member of Kirchhain's Jewish community.
Wife:
Miriam Bernsohn
Widow whom Strauss married in Paris; she died in 1985.
Son:
Thomas Strauss
Strauss adopted him after marrying his mother.
Daughter:
Jenny Strauss Clay
Daughter of Strauss's sister Bettina and Paul Kraus, adopted by Leo and Miriam Strauss; she became a professor of classics at the University of Virginia.
Sister:
Bettina Strauss
Married Paul Kraus.
brother-in-law:
Paul Kraus
Arabist who married Strauss's sister Bettina.
Friend:
Jacob Klein
Strauss's closest friend.
colleague:
Gerhard Krüger
Intellectual associate.
colleague:
Karl Löwith
Intellectual associate; Strauss met him in Heidelberg in 1954.
colleague:
Julius Guttmann
Intellectual associate.
colleague:
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Intellectual associate and admirer of Strauss's interpretations.
colleague:
Franz Rosenzweig
Strauss dedicated his first book to him.
colleague:
Gershom Scholem
A fellow German Zionist and admirer of Strauss.
colleague:
Alexander Altmann
Intellectual associate.
colleague:
Norbert Elias
German Jewish intellectual whom Strauss met during his student years.
colleague:
Leo Löwenthal
German Jewish intellectual whom Strauss met during his student years.
colleague:
Hannah Arendt
German Jewish intellectual whom Strauss met during his student years.
colleague:
Walter Benjamin
Became acquainted with Strauss as a student in Berlin and remained an admirer of his work.
colleague:
Carl Schmitt
Political and philosophical interlocutor; Schmitt's favorable reference to Strauss's work on Hobbes helped him secure fellowship support to leave Germany.
Friend:
Alexandre Kojève
Lifelong philosophical friend; they debated the proper political role of philosophers.
Friend:
Raymond Aron
Strauss was on friendly terms with him.
Friend:
Étienne Gilson
Strauss was on friendly terms with him.
Friend:
R. H. Tawney
Became a close friend while Strauss was in England.
colleague:
Isaiah Berlin
Strauss was on less friendly terms with him.
colleague:
Harold Laski
Supported Strauss's move to the United States by making introductions and helping him obtain a brief lectureship.
colleague:
David Daube
Strauss's in-law; helped him obtain temporary employment at Cambridge.
colleague:
Ernst Cassirer
Supervised Strauss's doctoral thesis.
colleague:
Edmund Husserl
Strauss attended courses taught by him at Freiburg.
colleague:
Martin Heidegger
Strauss attended courses taught by him at Marburg and later engaged extensively with his philosophy.
colleague:
Kurt Riezler
Used his influence to oppose Karl Popper's appointment at the University of Chicago after Strauss showed him Eric Voegelin's critical letter.
colleague:
Eric Voegelin
Correspondent whose letter criticizing Karl Popper's interpretation of Plato was shown by Strauss to Kurt Riezler.
colleague:
Karl Popper
Strauss rejected his interpretation of Plato's Republic.