Background
Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawny was born on September 8, 1864 in Cornwall, cf: 21 June 1929, Orne, France.
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Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse
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Education
Corpus Christi College. University of Oxford.
Career
Elected to a prize fellowship at Merton College, Oxford. 1887-1894; Fellow of Corpus C'hristi College, University of Oxford. 1894 7; Leader writer for the Manchester Guardian, 18971905.
Political editor of the Tribune. 1905-1907; the first Martin White Professor of Sociology, University of London.
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L. T. Hobhouse possessed remarkably diverse intellectual talents. A philosopher of distinction, he made important contributions to many other fields of enquiry: to research in the empirical sciences, to comparative psychology, to the foundation of sociology and to the systematization of a vast body of anthropological data. He was also a man of practical affairs—a journalist and controversialist—whose innate humanitarianism inspired many leading social reformers of his day. Of his intellectual contribution R. Fletcher writes: ‘Hobhouse remains unquestionably the most considerable British sociologist of the twentieth century’. The central motivation of Hobhouse’s philosophy was the desire to develop a human science which would contribute to a rational reconstruction of society. To this end his distinctively philosophical work begins with an epistemological enquiry into the nature of rationality, proceeds to empirical investigations into the workings of mind in the organic world and in human society, encompasses a study of ethics and sociology, and returns to metaphysics in a final comprehensive synthesis. The originality of Hobhouse’s epistemology and philosophy of science lay in its distinctive combination of central features of the idealist and empiricist traditions of his time. On the one hand this acceptance of a coherence theory of rationality showed a sympathy with idealism. Justification and explanation must be sought in the interrelations of the parts to the whole; the justification of all judgements, even the most basic, depends on their place in a coherent and comprehensive body of beliefs. On the other hand there are empiricist elements in Hobhouse’s epistemology. Each categorical judgement asserts a reality independent of the mind of the judging agent, and perceptual beliefs possess initial credibility although they must support and be supported by other judgements. Although sym pathetic to idealism, he was. says Ginsberg, ‘one of the founders of modern epistemological realism’ (1929). Hobhouse’s account of the nature and signficance of minds is central to his philosophy. He viewed the emergence of minds, with the capacity for rational direction, as being a crucial turningpoint in the evolutionary process and accordingly rejected the belief that evolution is the outcome of inevitable biological processes. In 1901 he attacked the traditional dichotomy of mental and physical substances, arguing that the crucial issues in the philosophy of mind are those concerning the form of explanation appropriate to human behaviour rather than the ontological issue concerning the nature and existence of mind. Experience reveals three different systems of explanation: mechanical, organic and telcogical. Humans arc psychophysical organisms in which mechanical modes of action are qualified by teleological ones. Hobhouse held, therefore, that teleological rather than mechanical explanation is appropriate to human behaviour. Within this context a series of stages of development are mapped out, tracing evolution from elementary forms of life to the self-critical awareness of human personality. The central idea of Hobhouse’s theory of development is the existence of broad correlations between social development and the growth of mind. This development, however, is not automatic: it depends on human activity and ideas. Ultimately social development has as its end the harmonious fulfilment of human potentiality achieved in common with all mankind. The concept of harmony also played a central role in Hobhouse's moral and social theories. In 1921 he argued that the rational good is a harmony of experience with feeling carried consistently through the entire realm of mind and value. Although abstract and obscure when thus formally stated, this conception of harmony proved to be particularly fruitful and unifying when applied to fundamental problems in value theory. For example, he held that the common good is not merely the aggregate of individual goods, it is a harmony of which individual goods are interrelated elements; rights, specifying conditions requisite for the harmonious fulfilment of personality in society, are claims to the common good. In 1913 and 1927 we have a comprehensive synthesis of his central philosophical ideas, a synthesis which, according to Ginsberg (1929) ‘must win for him a high place amongst the systematic thinkers of the world'. According to this definitive statement of his views an explanation of reality as a whole and of the development of civilization requires the recognition of an interconnecting force, of a correlating and conative activity, which guides development towards growth and maturity. The unity to which it gives rise cannot be that of a mechanical system, nor can it be completely organic. Hobhouse insists that it must be teleological and he calls the power ‘Mind’. Mind is not reality itself but is a part ol reality; it is that part of reality which makes for the emerging unity and order to which the empirical sciences bear witness. Development and Purpose (1913-1927) is typical of all of Hobhouse’s work. The Comtean conception of a growing and developing humanity is blended with an evolutionary bias derived from Spencer; a reconciliation is sought between these and the idealist conception of the growth of objective mind; and the entire account is infused by positivist influences derived from Mill. Sources: M. Ginsberg ‘Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse, Journal of Philosophical Studies 4, 1929; Edwards.
