Background
Liu Kunyi was born on January 21, 1830 Xinning, Hunan, China.
刘坤
Liu Kunyi was born on January 21, 1830 Xinning, Hunan, China.
Liu Kunyi held a senior licentiate degree (jinshi) from the imperial examination system. He entered the Hunan army in 1855, and worked under Li Hongzhang during the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion. In recognition of his services, he was created a baron and awarded the position of governor of Jiangxi, a role in which he served from 1865 to 1874.
Liu's career can be divided into three stages: as a military leader in 1855-1865; as governor and governor general in 1865-1882; and as governor general of Liang Jiang in 1891-1902.
Not much is known about Liu's early years, except that he earned his lingsheng (senior licentiate) status before joining Liu Changyou's mercenary (yong) forces in 1855. In the war against the Taipings, he quickly gained recognition for his bravery. Victories in Jiangxi soon led to a succession of rewards,culminating in the brevet of a circuit intendant in 1857. For the next two years, Liu Kunyi followed Changyou in pursuit of the Taipings from Ji-angxi to Hunan, and then into Guangxi. As Changyou was rewarded with the governorship of Guangxi in 1860 and Liu Kunyi the title of provincial trea-surer, Changyou gave him the command of his entire army, and stationed him at Liuzhou. Continued military success brought him first the judgeship of Guangdong in May 1862 and the treasurership of Guangxi in October, the same time when Ghangyou was made viceroy of the Liang Gung provinces. In Guangxi, Liu Kunyi finally put an end to the Dachengguo (Kingdom of Ultimate Accomplishment) of the rebellious Heaven and Earth Society, whose leaders and their relatives he executed with telling brutality. In mid-1865 Liu Kunyi was rewarded with the governorship of Jiangxi as Shen Baozhen retired to his native Fuzhou.
During his nine years in Jiangxi, Liu Kunyi attempted to restore peace and order through conservative means. In contrast to Shen’s energetic and hands-on approach to government, Liu believed in the virtue of less government. Rather, he relied on the self-interests of the gentry to achieve the goals of postrebellion rehabilitation. He was equally indulgent toward the good and the gentry. Even the punishment of his provincial officials was partly to appease the gentry, as were his efforts to seek greater civil service examination quotas for Jiangxi candidates. In financial management, Liu Kunyi always made sure that the demands of the central government and the imperial court were met first. To cover Jiangxi's needs, he reduced expenses by demobilizing large numbers of yotig mercenaries, eliminated the less profitable lijitt stations, and increased the land and poll taxes by collecting them in silver rather than in copper cash. The last measure did provoke instances of tax resistance, but the disorder was quickly suppressed. By his overall ability to maintain peace and to meet the revenue demands of the throne, Liu's administration was viewed favorably in Beijing.
Liu Kunyi was promoted to acting governor general of Liang Jiang in early 1875. Yet his long tenure in Jiangxi was distinctly lacking in reformist drive. Nor was there any attempt to modernize the weapons or training of the troops he kept after demobilization. In 1875, following the Japanese invasion of Taiwan, when a number of high-ranking officials were asked to submit proposals for improving the empire’s defense, all Liu could offer was some half-hearted support for the building of steam-powered warships and Western-style guns. Secretly, he confided to a colleague that uself-strengthening did not depend on ships and guns. Further, he was deadly opposed to the telegraph and the railway, which he thought would turn China's civilization into barbarism.
In the next several years, Liu Kunyi was governor general first of Liang Guang (1875-1880) and then of Liang Jiang (1880-1882). His administration of Liang Guang was effective. He brought stability to provincial government by cutting the number of acting appointments and frequent changes of of-fice. He increased revenue by way of setting a uniform rate for the opium lijin. He combated salt smuggling by using steam patrol boats and by al-locating surplus salt to commercial dealers. He curbed gambling and, by deployment of military force, maintained peace and order. In his last year in Liang Guang, the Japanese annexed the Liuqiu Islands while the dispute with the Russians over the Yili region also came to a head. In weighing the relative importance of the issues, Liu Kunyi took the safe, traditional position the northwest must be defended, whereas Liuqiu could be sacrificed. In this, he failed to rise above the age-old dispute between frontier and maritime defense. And when the settlement with Russia turned out to be far too conciliatory, leading to a death sentence for Chonghou, who negotiated the treaty, Liu Kunyi, fearful of British and French opposition, opposed the execution. This "about face" drew the ire of the war party, among whose vociferous proponents were members of the Qingliu group. In an attempt to ingratiate himself with some of the Qingliu scholars, however, Liu Kunyi further gave them cause for criticism. He was soon relieved of his duties.
Since the early 1860s, the Liang Jiang provinces had been largely put in the hands of Hunanese to counterbalance the power of Li Hongzhang in the north. In late 1889, with the death of Zeng Guoquan the Liang Jiang viceroyalty became vacant. As Liu Kunyi was now a leading Hunanese, he was recalled from retirement and put back in his old office at Nanjing.
In the spring of 1891, a series of antimissionary riots broke out along the Grand Canal and the Yangzi River. Concerned with maintaining good re-lations with the Western powers Liu Kunyi cooperated with Zhang Zhidong in protecting the Christians and putting down the rioters. Liu’s decisiveness in crushing the riots stood in stark contrast to his wavering during the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-1895. When the throne appointed him imperial commissioner and put him in charge of the forces on either side of Shanhaiguan in late 1894, he repeatedly delayed his departure on flimsy excuses. Yet, when the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki became known, he joined Zhang Zhidong in denouncing Li Hongzhang of selling out China. Liu Kunyi advocated continuing the war effort, and sent support to the resistance movement on Taiwan. But, within a month, when the situation changed, he condemned the resistance movement and demanded their return to the mainland.
Three events at the end of his long career showed him in a much more favorable light and regained for him a place among the notable officials of the Qing. First, following the suppression of the Hundred Day reform, when the Empress Dowager Cixi plotted to dethrone the Guangxu Emperor, Three events at the end of his long career showed him in a much more favorable light and regained for him a place among the notable officials of the Qing. First, following the suppression of the Hundred Day reform, when the Empress Dowager Cixi plotted to dethrone the Guangxu Emperor, Liu was almost alone in opposing Cixi. As a result, his stature rose significantly.
Second, during the Boxer Uprising, Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong repeatedly warned the Empress Dowager of the suicidal policy she was pursuing. And when she declared war on the foreign powers on June 21, 1900, Liu, Zhang, and Li Hongzhang disobeyed imperial orders and declared their provinces neutral. They thus helped restrict the Boxers to the north, and saved China from even greater disasters at the hands of the imperialist powers.
Finally, in the wake of the Boxer catastrophe, Liu Kunyi and Zhang jointly submitted three memorials on reform. Despite their rather conservative hue, they became the basis for the Empress Dowager to launch a series of reform in the next several years. The reforms, which were remarkably similar to those the Empress Dowager had opposed in 1898, provided opportunities for the emergent social groups to express their grievance and demonstrate their newfound power. They thus ironically helped hasten the demise of the Qing dynasty. Liu died in office the following year, aged seventy. was almost alone in opposing Cixi. As a result, his stature rose significantly. Second, during the Boxer Uprising, Liu and Zhang Zhidong repeatedly warned the Empress Dowager of the suicidal policy she was pursuing. And when she declared war on the foreign powers on June 21, 1900, Liu, Zhang, and Li Hongzhang disobeyed imperial orders and declared their provinces neutral. They thus helped restrict the Boxers to the north, and saved China from even greater disasters at the hands of the imperialist powers. Finally, in the wake of the Boxer catastrophe, Liu and Zhang jointly submitted three memorials on reform. Despite their rather conservative hue, they became the basis for the Empress Dowager to launch a series of reform in the next several years. The reforms, which were remarkably similar to those the Empress Dowager had opposed in 1898, provided opportunities for the emergent social groups to express their grievance and demonstrate their newfound power. They thus ironically helped hasten the demise of the Qing dynasty.
Liu Kunyi died in office the following year, aged seventy.