Bachelor of Arts City College New York, 1960. Doctor of Philosophy Purdue University, 1964.
Assistant Professor, Association Professor of Economics, Graduate School Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 7, 1967-1970. Professor Managerial Economics, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School Management, Northwestern University, 9. Harold L. Stuart Professor Managerial Economics, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, United States of America, since 1979.
(Technical advance requires resources and is motivated by ...)
My interest in the economics of technical change stems from the claim in the popular press in the late 1950s and early 1960s that automation was reducing job opportunities for the unskilled. Technological advance was thought to be the source of structural unemployment with a bias against the unskilled. I sought to analyse this question by determining the profitmaximising behaviour of a firm through time when its production function was endogeneous and subject to change.
My interest then turned to the question of whether a competitive market system led to overor under-investment in technical advance. On the one hand the inability of firms to capture all the rewards from a technical advance suggested under-investment while on the other hand, the race to be first suggested over-investment. I and N. L. Schwartz attempted to analyse this question by determining how rapidly a firm would develop an innovation when faced by the prospect that rivals were also attempting to achieve the same innovation.
This model was extended in several directions culminating in an effort to use it to explain the empirically observed phenomenon that a market structure intermediate between monopoly and perfect competition led to the most rapid rate of technical advance. My interest in limit pricing stemmed from the belief that previous work on this subject was not founded on profit-maximising behaviour of the firm and required an unrealistic amount of information by the incumbent firm. Specifically, in the previous work it was assumed that the incumbent firm set its price so as to prevent entry forever.
It was not clear that this was a long-run, profit-maximising strategy. Moreover, the incumbent firm was assumed to know exactly the cost function of any potential entrant. This assumption appeared too severe.
My interest at present has turned to interaction among firms through time.