Background
Mele, Alfred R. was born on May 22, 1951 in Detroit, Michigan, United States. Son of Alfred Emil and Rosemary (Pardo) Mele.
(What place does motivation have in the lives of intellige...)
What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B009CPOK0A/?tag=2022091-20
(What place does motivation have in the lives of intellige...)
What place does motivation have in the lives of intelligent agents? Mele's answer is sensitive to the concerns of philosophers of mind and moral philosophers and informed by empirical work. He offers a distinctive, comprehensive, attractive view of human agency. This book stands boldly at the intersection of philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/019515617X/?tag=2022091-20
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00DF9O3FG/?tag=2022091-20
(Although much human action serves as proof that irrationa...)
Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In addition, he defends an account of self-control, argues that "strict" akratic action is an insurmountable obstacle for traditional belief-desire models of action-explanation, and explains how a considerably modified model accommodates action of this sort.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195080017/?tag=2022091-20
( Self-deception raises complex questions about the natur...)
Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691057451/?tag=2022091-20
(This book addresses two related topics: self-control and ...)
This book addresses two related topics: self-control and individual autonomy. In approaching these issues, Mele develops a conception of an ideally self-controlled person, and argues that even such a person can fall short of personal autonomy. He then examines what needs to be added to such a person to yield an autonomous agent and develops two overlapping answers: one for compatibilist believers in human autonomy and one for incompatibilists. While remaining neutral between those who hold that autonomy is compatible with determinism and those who deny this, Mele shows that belief that there are autonomous agents is better grounded than belief that there are not.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195150430/?tag=2022091-20
(Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers t...)
Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issue in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will - one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195374398/?tag=2022091-20
(Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of actio...)
Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from that of beliefs and desires. Mele, also offers a provocative explanation of how we come to have intentions and elaborates on his earlier work concerning akratic failures of will.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/019507114X/?tag=2022091-20
philosopher university professor
Mele, Alfred R. was born on May 22, 1951 in Detroit, Michigan, United States. Son of Alfred Emil and Rosemary (Pardo) Mele.
Mele attended Wayne State University and received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Michigan in 1979.
He is also the Director of the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control Project and past director of the Big Questions in Free Will Project (2010-2013). Mele is the author of ten books and over 200 articles He taught at Davidson College from 1979 until 2000, when he took up his present position at Florida State University.
Mele began his career writing about Aristotle and practical reason, but gradually moved into a focus on contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind and action.
While not taking a stand on the question whether free will is or is not compatible with determinism, Mele develops positive conceptions of how free will may be implemented from both “compatibilist” and “incompatibilist” perspectives. He also has argued that claims that scientists have proved that free will is an illusion are not credible.
Mele is also known for his development of a causal theory of how intentional actions are produced and for his deflationary view of self-deception.
(Although much human action serves as proof that irrationa...)
(Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of actio...)
(What place does motivation have in the lives of intellige...)
(What place does motivation have in the lives of intellige...)
( Self-deception raises complex questions about the natur...)
(Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers t...)
(This book addresses two related topics: self-control and ...)
(Will be shipped from US. Used books may not include compa...)
Member American Philosophical Association, Southern Association Philosophy and Psychology, North Carolina Philosophical Society (president 1987-1989).
Married Constance, July 18, 1970. Children: Al, Nick, Angela.