Background
WIGGINS, David was born on March 8, 1933 in London. Son of Noiman Wiggins and Diana (nee Priestley) Wiggins.
(In this book, which revises and greatly expands his class...)
In this book, which revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance (Blackwell, 1980), David Wiggins examines the logic of identity, the ideas of substance and change, essence, predication and mortal predication, personhood, and personal memory. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and analytic philosophy.
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(This collection of essays passes to and fro between probl...)
This collection of essays passes to and fro between problems of ethics, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind and philosophy of logic and language. Conspicious among the various problems attempted is the controversial question of cognitivism in ethics. From the many projects and themes that run through the essays the following emerge most prominently: the elucidation of the ideas of truth, objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity; the scope and limits of the attribution of the status of plain truth among the judgements of morals, politics and aesthetics; the part played in the fixation of the sense of evaluative language by the antecedent possibility of agreement in judgements and in sentiments; the irreplaceability and irreducibility for practical or valuational thinking of such ideas as those of need, self and metaphysical freedom. The collection comprises ten pieces altogether, including a new postscript and three previously unpublished essays. Essays already published have been edited and revised, and in some cases extended.
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(Needs, Values, Truth brings together of some of the most ...)
Needs, Values, Truth brings together of some of the most important and influential writings by a leading contemporary philosopher, drawn from twenty-five years of his work in the broad area of the philosophy of value. The author ranges between problems of ethics, meta-ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of logic and language, looking at questions relating to meaning, truth and objectivity in judgements of value. For this third edition he has added a new essay on incommensurability, in addition to making minor revisions to the existing text. The volume will stand as a definitive summation of his work in this area.
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Metaphy sician philosopher of mind: ethicist
WIGGINS, David was born on March 8, 1933 in London. Son of Noiman Wiggins and Diana (nee Priestley) Wiggins.
Oxford University. BA 1955. Manuscripts and Archives 1958. /nfls: Heraclitus, Aristotle, Leibniz, Hume, Frege, Peirce, Tarski, P. Strawson, B. Williams.
J. L. Austin. Putnam, Kripke. R. Cartwright. McDowell and G. Evans.
Assistant principal Home Civil Service, 1957-1958. Jane Eliza Proctor visiting fellow Princeton University, 1958-1959. Fellow New College Oxford, 1960-1967.
Professor philosophy Bedford College University London, 1967-1980. Fellow, praelector in philosophy University College, Oxford, 1981-1989. Professor philosophy Birkbeck College University London, 1989-1994.
Wykeham professor Logic University Oxford, 1993-1900. Visiting professor Stanford (California) University, 1962-1963, 63-64. Visiting fellow All Souls College, Oxford, 1973.
Visiting professor Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968. James Loeb visiting fellow in classical philosophy, 1972. Meyer professor School of Law New York University, 1989.
Visiting lecturer Istituto della Storia della Filosofia, University Padua, Italy, 1983. John Locke lecturer in philosophy of medicine Society Apothecaries, City of London, 1982. Chairman Transport Users Consultative Committee for South East, 1978-1981, president, Austotelian Society, 2000-2001.
(In this book, which revises and greatly expands his class...)
(Needs, Values, Truth brings together of some of the most ...)
(This collection of essays passes to and fro between probl...)
(Almost everyone has wondered at some time or another why ...)
( Almost every thoughtful person wonders at some time why...)
(Will be shipped from US. Used books may not include compa...)
(Book by Wiggins, David)
Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality defends a position he calls "moral objectivism". "Towards a reasonable libertarianism" (Essays on Freedom of Action, 1973 - Routledge & Kegan Paul).
Wiggins's two main books, published in 1967 and 1980, focus on problems concerning identity—and indeed illustrate this, since the latter started by revising the former but kept only half a chapter. Starting from an Aristotelian distinction between the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of constitution, he insists on two theses which go together, despite often being taken to clash, and which have both proved controversial. First, identity is absolute, not relative, i.e.acannot be the same /-thing as b while not being the same g-thing as b. But, second, a and b cannot simply be the same, without there being some kind / such that they are the same /-thing. A substance must have some sortal property, obeying certain restrictions, which applies to it throughout its history, and the implications of this are discussed for natural kind terms, artifacts, works of art, and persons. The later chapters of Sameness and Substance develop a moderate essentialism, on the basis of argument not presupposing modal logic. According to Wiggins moderate essentialism which individuals belong essentially to some kind or species. Individual essences are dispensed with, however, even though the necessity of identity is vindicated. Wiggins defends his view of identity and individualism against certain constrasting extreme positions of simple realism and outright conceptualism. He bases the concept of a person on an objective view of human beings as animals, partly rescuing Locke’s use of memory from Butler’s charge of circularity by making memory one but only one ingredient in what identifies persons. Persons are conscious continuants, conscious of their states as continuants. They are things in nature, i.e. animals, but animals that interpret one another in the light of ‘norms of rationality and reciprocity. Needs, Values, and Truth (1987) contains one of the few systematic treatments in analytical philosophy of the idea of a need as it figures in moral and political argument, and explores many other themes relating philosophy with metaphysics and the philosophy of language. But it is perhaps most noted for developing a kind of pluralism concerning values which is cognitivist, objectivist and subjectivist. Wiggins deprecates the term ‘moral realism’; he relies on a view of truth which owes something to both Peirce and Tarski and rejects the correspondence theory.
Fellow British Academy. Member American Association for the Advancement of Science (honorary foreign member), Institute International Philosophy. M C.