Background
Jacobs, Jonathan A. was born on November 28, 1955 in Stamford, Connecticut, United States. Son of N. J. and S. M. Jacobs.
(Dimensions of Moral Theory examines the key presuppositio...)
Dimensions of Moral Theory examines the key presuppositions and philosophical commitments that support and shape moral theories.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00DO47XUY/?tag=2022091-20
(In this original study, Jonathan Jacobs provides a new ac...)
In this original study, Jonathan Jacobs provides a new account of ethical realism that combines both abstract meta-ethical issues defining the debate on realism and concrete topics in moral psychology. Jacobs argues that practical reasoners can both understand the ethical significance of facts and be motivated to act by that understanding. In that sense, objective considerations are prescriptive. In his discussion of the theory of practical realism, he extends themes and claims originating in Aristotelian ethics while engaging with the most important contemporary literature. Arguing that desire and reason can agree on what is good, Jacobs explains how good action is naturally pleasing to the agent. In acting well, the agent affirms certain values and enjoys doing so. Jacobs grounds his explanation of ethical value in detailed explorations of the moral psychology of self-love, friendship, and respect. Students and scholars of philosophy will be intrigued by this integrated account of meta-ethics, practical reason, and moral psychology.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0878405836/?tag=2022091-20
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B011820FBC/?tag=2022091-20
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B010EW3ZXW/?tag=2022091-20
( Dimensions of Moral Theory examines the key presupposit...)
Dimensions of Moral Theory examines the key presuppositions and philosophical commitments that support and shape moral theories.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0631229647/?tag=2022091-20
(Are there key respects in which character and character d...)
Are there key respects in which character and character defects are voluntary? Can agents with serious vices be rational agents? Jonathan Jacobs answers in the affirmative. Moral character is shaped through voluntary habits, including the ways we habituate ourselves, Jacobs believes. Just as individuals can voluntarily lead unhappy lives without making unhappiness an end, so can they degrade their ethical characters through voluntary action that does not have establishment of vice as its end. Choosing Character presents an account of ethical disability, expanding the domain of responsibility and explicating the role of character in ethical cognition. Jacobs contends that agents become ethically disabled voluntarily when their habits impair their ability to properly appreciate ethical considerations. Such agents are rational, responsible individuals who are yet incapable of virtuous action. The view develops and modifies Aristotelian claims concerning the fixity of character. Jacobs' interpretation is developed in contrast to the overlooked work of Maimonides, who also used Aristotelian resources but argued for the possibility of character change. The notion of ethical disability has profound ramifications for ethics and for current debates about blame and punishment.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0801438594/?tag=2022091-20
Jacobs, Jonathan A. was born on November 28, 1955 in Stamford, Connecticut, United States. Son of N. J. and S. M. Jacobs.
Bachelor, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, 1977. Doctor of Philosophy, University Pennsylvania, 1983.
Professor Philosophy Colgate University, Hamilton, New York. Visiting professor University Edinburgh, Scotland, 1999. Honorary lecturer University St. Andrews, Scotland, 2000.
(In this original study, Jonathan Jacobs provides a new ac...)
(Are there key respects in which character and character d...)
(Dimensions of Moral Theory examines the key presuppositio...)
( Dimensions of Moral Theory examines the key presupposit...)
Member of Southern Society for Phliosophy and Psychology, British Society for Ethical Theory, American Philosophical Association, Clare Hall Cambridge University (life).
Married Nancy L. Pruitt. Children: Nathan, Daniel.
