Background
TELSER, Lester C. was born in 1931 in Chicago, Illinois, United States of America.
( This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies...)
This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of competitive and non-competitive behavior. Written by one of the world's leading mathematical economists, the book is mathematically rigorous. No other book is currently available giving a game theoretic analysis of competition with basic mathematical tools. Economic theorists have been working on a new and fundamental approach to the theory of competition and market structure, an approach inspired by appreciation of the earlier work of Edgeworth and Bohm-Bawerk and making use of the new tools of the theory of games as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and monopolistic markets. Its central concept is "the theory of the core of the market," and it is concerned, with the conditions under which markets will or will not achieve the characteristics of uniform prices and welfare optimality. Telser provides a number of insights into the symptoms of competition, when and how competition is bought into play, the mechanisms of competition and collusion, the results of competition and collusion, and the results of competition and collusion for the economy and for the general public. Many misconceptions about the nature of a competitive equilibrium are dispelled. The book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains extensive empirical research in private industry. These empirical findings, from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing industries.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0202060438/?tag=2022091-20
( An important tenet of game theory, core theory has none...)
An important tenet of game theory, core theory has nonetheless been all but ignored by the mainstream. Its basic premise is that individuals band together in order to promote their interests as much as possible. The return to an individual depends on competition among various coalitions for its membership, and a group of people can obtain a joint maximum by suitable coordinated actions. In this key title, Lester Telser investigates the following issues: • Markets • Multiproduct Industry Total Cost Functions with Avoidable Costs • Critical Analyses of Noncooperative Equilibria. Through these distinct sections, Telser skilfully brings the ideas of core theory to bear on a range of issues within economics – with particular emphasis on supply and demand and the way markets function.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/041549365X/?tag=2022091-20
TELSER, Lester C. was born in 1931 in Chicago, Illinois, United States of America.
Bachelor of Arts Roosevelt University, Illinois, 1951. Master of Arts, Doctor of Philosophy University Chicago, 1953, 1956.
Research Assistant, Cowles Commission Research Economics, 1952-1954. Company-op Agent, United States Department Agriculture, Economics Department, University Chicago, 1954-1955. Assistant Professor of Economics, Iowa State College, 1955-1956.
United States Army, 1956-1958.
Faculty, Graduate School Business, University Chicago, 1958-1965. Visiting Research Fellow, Cowles Foundation Research Economics, Yale University, 1964-1965.
Ford Faculty Research Fellow, Centre for Operations Research and Econometrics, Belguim, University Louvain, Belgium, 1969-1970. Professor of Economics, University Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, since 1965.
Association Editor, Journal of the American Statistical Association,
9, Review of Economics and Statistics, since 1972, J. Futures Markets, since 1980.
( This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies...)
( An important tenet of game theory, core theory has none...)
(Competition, collusion and game theory.)
Starting with my doctoral dissertation completed in 1956, I have continued to work on various aspects of organised futures markets. This research began with an investigation of monetary theory. My current research still draws close analogies between monetary theory and the theory of these markets.
My interest in trade and exchange led me to the theory of the core.
This theory has furnished me with a powerful tool to study various problems of industrial organisation, including departure from marginal cost pricing, the balance between co-operation and competition, and a deeper understanding of the competitive process. The focus of this work is on the many ways that are used to advance the mutual gain of buyer and seller by devising methods of sharing the costs and benefits from long-term investments of all sorts. These raise free-rider problems for which business firms have found ingenious solutions such as resale price maintenance.
Though many economists regarded such practices as anticompetitive, I explain them and similar ones as solutions of free-rider problems that enhance consumer welfare. Many departures from marginal cost pricing that seem at first blush anti-competitive
have a similar explanation as a solution of a free-rider problem in disguise. The theory of self-enforcing agreements grows from this work.
This theory poses the problem of what penalties the parties to a co-operative venture can invoke in order to secure compliance to it if they have no recourse to a third-party as an enforcer. The Prisoners’ Dilemma is the best-known example where the problem arises. In real situations, people find ways of solving these dilemmas by an appropriate design of self-enforcing agreements.
I view the nonco-operative equilibrium, which is usually inefficient, as the punishment or as the alternative to an efficient co-operative agreement. Either by forming coalitions or by devising suitable strategies, people invent incentives to advance their mutual gains from co-operation.