Background
O’Neill, Onora was born on August 23, 1941 in Aughafatten, Northern Ireland.
O’Neill, Onora was born on August 23, 1941 in Aughafatten, Northern Ireland.
Somerville College, Oxford, 1959-1962. Harvard University, 1963-1969.
Assistant, then Associate Professor, Barnard College, Columbia University, 1970-1977. Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, Reader, then Professor, University of Essex, 1977-1992. Since 1992, Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge.
O’Neill is concerned with developing a reading of Kant’s ethical theory which counters the objection that it is too abstract and inflexible to be a practical guide for human action. She interprets Kant’s critique of reason as constructivist and antifoundationalist. The authority of reason stems not from the solitary reasoner but from principles of thought and action that can be freely adopted by a community of reasoners. For Kant, then, both practical and theoretical reason rest on the categorical imperative. O'Neill views the categorical imperative as a principle of universalization applied in different situations to assess the agent’s intentions, and so it is not the source of a general set of rules, but rather it tells us how to act rightly in each particular case. She argues that the categorical imperative is a useful principle for action on the grounds that the formulation of a maxim involves all facts and circumstances relevant to the agent’s intentions. O’Neill contrasts her position with the Kantian liberalism of Rawls. The categorical imperative includes obligations which extend beyond those connected with rights since it generates both perfect and imperfect obligations, thereby making room for virtues as well as rights. In arguing that maxims may be collectively formulated and rejected, O’Neill seeks an alternative to the position that Kant’s ethics is essentially individualistic. Out of this interpretation of Kant, O'Neill develops an account of justice which combines the application of universal principles with a sensitivity to context and difference. She believes that Kantian ethics can thus be more readily applied to solving contemporary problems such as hunger and poverty.