Background
Gelb, Leslie Howard was born on March 4, 1937 in New Rochelle, New York, United States. Son of Max and Dorothy (Klein) Gelb.
( "If a historian were allowed but one book on the Americ...)
"If a historian were allowed but one book on the American involvement in Vietnam, this would be it." — Foreign Affairs When first published in 1979, four years after the end of one of the most divisive conflicts in the United States, The Irony of Vietnam raised eyebrows. Most students of the war argued that the United States had "stumbled into a quagmire in Vietnam through hubris and miscalculation," as the New York Times's Fox Butterfield put it. But the perspective of time and the opening of documentary sources, including the Pentagon Papers, had allowed Gelb and Betts to probe deep into the decisionmaking leading to escalation of military action in Vietnam. The failure of Vietnam could be laid at the door of American foreign policy, they said, but the decisions that led to the failure were made by presidents aware of the risks, clear about their aims, knowledgeable about the weaknesses of their allies, and under no illusion about the outcome. The book offers a picture of a steely resolve in government circles that, while useful in creating consensus, did not allow for alternative perspectives. In the years since its publication, The Irony of Vietnam has come to be considered the seminal work on the Vietnam War.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00YPS1WQ4/?tag=2022091-20
( Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree...)
Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter "was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system —the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures —was designed to do, and it did it." The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0815730713/?tag=2022091-20
( "If a historian were allowed but one book on the Americ...)
"If a historian were allowed but one book on the American involvement in Vietnam, this would be it." Foreign Affairs When first published in 1979, four years after the end of one of the most divisive conflicts in the United States, The Irony of Vietnam raised eyebrows. Most students of the war argued that the United States had "stumbled into a quagmire in Vietnam through hubris and miscalculation," as the New York Times's Fox Butterfield put it. But the perspective of time and the opening of documentary sources, including the Pentagon Papers, had allowed Gelb and Betts to probe deep into the decisionmaking leading to escalation of military action in Vietnam. The failure of Vietnam could be laid at the door of American foreign policy, they said, but the decisions that led to the failure were made by presidents aware of the risks, clear about their aims, knowledgeable about the weaknesses of their allies, and under no illusion about the outcome. The book offers a picture of a steely resolve in government circles that, while useful in creating consensus, did not allow for alternative perspectives. In the years since its publication, The Irony of Vietnam has come to be considered the seminal work on the Vietnam War.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0815726783/?tag=2022091-20
organization president lecturer
Gelb, Leslie Howard was born on March 4, 1937 in New Rochelle, New York, United States. Son of Max and Dorothy (Klein) Gelb.
AB magna cum laude in Government and cum laude in Philosophy, Tufts University, 1959. Doctor of Laws (honorary), Tufts University, 2009. Master of Arts, Harvard University, 1961.
Doctor of Philosophy, Harvard University, 1964.
Teaching fellow government and social science, non-resident tutor Winthrop House, Harvard University, 1962-1964, associate defense studies program, 1963-1964. Assistant professor government Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, 1964-1965. Executive assistant to Senator Jacob K. Javits United States Senate, 1966-1967.
Deputy director policy planning staff United States Department Defense, Washington, 1967-1968, director policy planning staff, 1968, acting deputy assistant secretary for policy planning and arms control staff, 1968-1969. Director Vietnam Task Force, 1967-1968. Senior fellow Brookings Institution, Washington, 1969-1973.
Correspondent The New York Times, 1973-1977. Director bureau politico-military affairs United States Department State, 1977-1979. Senior associate Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979-1981.
Chairman Carnegie Endowment Panel on Future United States Security and Arms Control, 1980-1981. National security correspondent The New York Times, 1981-1986, deputy editorial page editor, op-editorial page editor, 1986-1990, foreign affairs columnist, 1991-1993. President Council Foreign Relations, 1993—2003, president emeritus, senior fellow bd, since 2003.
Board directors certain funds advised by Salomon Brothers Asset Management, certain registered investment companies advised by Legg Mason Mutual Fund, Center Partners Fund, britannica.com, Blockstone Ludia Fund & Asia Tigers Fund, The Nixon Center. Member The Trilateral Commission, 1993-2000. Chairman advisory board, National Society Network, board directors, Iraq & Afganisthan Veterinary American, Taiwan National Security Project Advisory Board,advisory board member, Peters G. Peterson Foundation.
( "If a historian were allowed but one book on the Americ...)
( "If a historian were allowed but one book on the Americ...)
( Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree...)
( Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree...)
Trustee emeritus Tufts University, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Affairs, Columbia University, 1997-2001. Board directors James A. Baker III Institute Public Policy.
Advisory member Center Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University John F. Kennedy School Government, 1991-2001. Fellow American Association for the Advancement of Science. Member International Institute Strategic Studies, Council Foreign Relations.
Married Judith Cohen, August 2, 1959. Children: Adam, Caroline, Alison.