Background
Borcherding, Thomas Earl was born on February 18, 1939 in Cincinnati. Son of Earl Schaff and Vivian Joan (Miller) Borcherding.
Borcherding, Thomas Earl was born on February 18, 1939 in Cincinnati. Son of Earl Schaff and Vivian Joan (Miller) Borcherding.
Bachelor of Arts University Cincinnati, 1961. Doctor of Philosophy Duke University, 1966.
Assistant Professor, University Washington, Seattle, 1966-1971. Association Professor of Economics, Research Association, Center Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and State University, 1971-1973. National Fellow, Hoover Institute, Institution, Stanford University,1974-1975.
Professor Law and Economics, University Toronto, 1978-1979. Visiting Senior Scholar, Hoover Institute, Institution, Stanford University, 1979-1980. Association Professor, Professor of Economics, Simon Fraser University, Canada, 1971-1984.
Professor of Economics, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California, United States of America, since 1984. Editorial Boards, Canadian Journal of Economics,
1975-1978, Pakistan J. Economics, 1980-1981, Cato J., since 1984. Co-editor, El, 1980.
(Book by Borcherding, Thomas E.)
Author: The Egg Board: The Social Cost of Monopoly, 1981. Contributor articles to professional journals.
In the main, my research has ranged over several issues of public choice economics. Beginning with my dissertation and more recently, this work has asked by how much, in what areas, and why does the democratic State grow? To aid this enquiry, a median-voter model of public sector demand was formulated in a choice-theoretic, empirically verifiable framework (1972) and extended to non-competitive bureaucratic circumstances (1977). Whether these collectively provided goods and services are highly consumption indivisible (‘public goods’) or are rent-seeking redistributions has also been a positive theme explored in the context of government budgets (1972, 1977), market regulation (1981) and public enterprise (1982,
1983).
The issue of why State action takes various supply forms — contracting out, public bureaucracy or regulation — is a more recent interest (1982, 1983). As a side issue the question of
why compensation to supplying agents is generally paid under the first two institutions, but not the last, was also pursued (1979).
Currently, my efforts are shifting to the question of the efficacy of policy analysis in worlds of rationally formed political expectations, reflecting the discussion of the value of openly available analyses of marketable assets. The parallels are not close because of the great differences in transactions costs between representative politics and highly transferable, monitorable private assets.
Given this understanding, the possibilities and limitations of fiscal and monetary manipulations by incumbents, the so-called ‘political business cycle’, is now being considered. I continue to work on the possibilities and limitations of complex-contracting and co-ordination of n-person public goods demands through private market mechanisms, a task begun with my 1978 paper on the subject.
Member American Economic Association, Western Economic Association (editor 1980-1997), Canada Economic Association, Public Choice Society, Mont Pelerin Society, Phi Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Epsilon, Phi Delta Theta.
Married Rhoda Jean Larson, November 23, 1968. Children: Matthew James, Benjamin Adam.