Background
Regan, Thomas Howard was born on November 28, 1938 in Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania.
Regan, Thomas Howard was born on November 28, 1938 in Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania.
University of Virginia.
1965-1967, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar, Virginia. From 1967, Associate Professor and Professor, North Carolina State University.
Thomas Regan has made important contributions to philosophical discussion of practical ethics, to study of the theoretical foundations of morality and to an understanding of the philosophy of G. E. Moore. Notable features of his work have been his arguments for the role of rights in moral theory and for the role he assigns to rights m our understanding of the moral status of ar>imals. Regan’s definitive statement of these Ihemes was given in The Case for Animal Rights J1983), a book which, according to A. L. Sumner, has raised to a new level the quality of argument °n the non-consequentialist side’. Regan rejects both egoism and Kantian approaches to ethics on the grounds of their mternal inconsistencies and their failure to accommodate our reflective intuitions. His main critical energies, however, are directed against militarianism. He argues in the two works of 1983 that a theory which advocates welfare maximization entails moral judgements which it would be outrageous to accept: in particular, since it would legitimize immoral forms of animal experimentat'on, it violates the principle that inherently valuable creatures should not be used as a mere means to the good of other creatures. Regan argues that ‘the respect principle' is the fundamental principle of morality. It entails other nghts, in particular a right to equal treatment which does not permit trade-offs with considerations of utility. Within this framework Regan develops an elaborate defence of the moral status °f animals. He argues that at least some animals are capable of intentional states such as beliefs, ‘mentions and emotions. Their interests are, therefore, a proper object of moral concern, and a contention of the book is that only a recognition of animal rights can do justice to this moral standing. While paying tribute to the force of his arguments for animal rights, some commentators have expressed surprise at the vehemence of Regan’s attack on philosophers who make welfare rather than rights the central concept in an account of the moral standing of animals. Regan’s work on G. E. Moore (1986) throws light on the formative influences on the development of Moore’s ethics and suggests distinctive interpretations of central doctrines of Principia Ethica. In spite of the striking contrasts between the positions of Moore and Kant, Regan presents Principia Ethica, especially the view that moral judgements are synthetic and the view that goodness is a simple non-natural property, as developments of essentially Kantian ideas and as liberating moral theory from oppressive conservatism. Moore’s controversial thesis that the only things which are intrinsically good are friendship and the appreciation of beautiful objects is presented as Moore’s attempt to find meaning in life after his abandonment of religious belief. Little attention is paid to the striking contrasts which exist between Moore's consequentialism and Kant's view of the foundations of ethics. Regan has contributed significantly to discussions of a wide range of other issues in practical ethics: to health care ethics, to business ethics and to the ethics of war and peace. Particularly influential was his argument in 1972 that standard objections to pacifism can be overcome in a deontological ethical system.