BPhil, JD, Master of Arts, Doctor of Philosophy University Chicago, 1947, 1950, 1955, 1957.
Association Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, 1955-1964. Professor, University Western Ontario, Canada, 1964-1965. Visiting Professor Mathematics Economics, Birmingham University, England, 1965-1966.
Consultant, United States Department Defense, 1966-1967. Esmee Fairbain Professor Economics Finance and Investment, Warwick University, England, 1967-1969; Cons, for Cambodia, United States Department State, 1974-1975. Professor of Economics, University College Buckingham, England, 1974-1977.
Visiting Professor of Economics, State University New York, Buffalo, University California Santa Barbara, 1978-1979, University Miami, 1980-1981, University California Davis, 1983, University Virginia, Charlottesville, 1983. Professor of Economics, York University, Downsview, Ontario, Canada, since 1981.
I should select the following four contributions. Influenced by A. Harberger and G. Chow, I was concerned to obtain correct models of stock-flow goods that could be estimated. This led to contri
butions to measurement of quality change in durable goods and, after meeting R. Clower in 1957, to stock/ flow formalisations that have helped explain shortand long-run effects of money supply changes and effects of changes in the cost of production of money.
Owing directly to lectures by M. Friedman (in turn influenced by A. Director), I became interested in tied sales. I took the analysis beyond simple price discrimination (metering devices, for example) into the field of general excise taxation, owing much to Hotelling. I have contributed to understanding of time in economic theory — owing much to J. Robinson. In 1963 I showed that the dynamics of models of tatonnement are not robust for deep, properly ‘macro’ theory.
And in 1968 that the stationary state of Marshall and Pigou is rooted in physical science. As far back as 1963, I tried to show that disequilibrium in macroeconomics cannot usefully be worked up from Walrasian models. Rather, disequilibrium can have two proper connotations.
One is ‘weak’: agents (in general, price quoters) may be disappointed or surprised by their results (an idea obviously related to Clower’s dual constraint). The other is ‘strong’: agents may not be able collectively to solve the welfareoptimisation problem conjugate to their collective decisions on prices and outputs. In neither case is disequilibrium properly characterised by the excess demand or supply derived from reaction to the auctioneer’s quotations.
If this point ever gets properly understood widely in the profession, I may be able to claim a part of the credit.